Here's
Anat Matar on Wittgenstein in the 1930s. She likes it, calling the
collection:
a fantastic example of what "philosophy as activity" actually means: a blessed anti-dogmatism and philosophical unease which yield moments of pure, genuine philosophy. The present volume, then, does a great service for Wittgenstein scholars and followers -- not only because of the depth and quality of the essays comprising it but also in reminding us what philosophy "as an activity" may mean.
I suspect this link won't work, but
my review of Ethics in the Wake of Wittgenstein is up at
Philosophical Investigations. Here's the conclusion:
the collection as a whole is successful. Whether non‐Wittgensteinian ethicists will pay much attention‚ is another question. They will not if they misunderstand Wittgensteinian views, which is why contributions such as Lovibond's and Taylor's are especially valuable. Nor will they if Wittgensteinian ethics appears to be backward‐looking, with nothing new to offer, which is one reason why the work of philosophers such as Christensen and Diamond is exciting. Two of the most insightful papers, by Hertzberg and Diamond, bring up questions about truth, reasoning, forms of life, and what it means to have a shared reality. These are very much the kinds of issues that Wittgenstein himself addressed, and we might also hope that these essays will help encourage non‐Wittgensteinians to see that there is much to be gained from paying attention not only to those who work in his wake but to Wittgenstein himself.
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