Showing posts with label Anscombe. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Anscombe. Show all posts

Saturday, March 7, 2026

Anscombe on Wittgenstein

I have a review forthcoming in Philosophical Investigations of John Berkman's and Roger Teichmann's Anscombe on Wittgenstein: Reminiscences of a Philosophical Friendship. The book is great, especially for the reminiscences from Anscombe (which she titled "Anecdotes"). But the published text differs in places from the original manuscript. Handwriting being what it is, it isn't always easy to be sure, but I think there about sixty places where the mansucript is slightly different from what has been published (which is based on a typescript produced by Luke Gormally, who numbered the paragraphs). It seemed pedantic to list these in the review, but perhaps some people will want to see them, so I thought I would publish them here. (In case you're wondering, I have read the original manuscript and took photos of it all, which I compared with the book.) OK, here's the list:

  1. On p. 121 section 13, last sentence (“He was regarded with some awe in his own family.”) is a separate paragraph in the original.
  2. Gormally's paragraph 72 begins on the same line as the last sentence of 71. I.e., Anscombe writes as if these are part of the same long paragraph.
  3. Similarly, Gormally’s 154 begins on the same line as the end of his 153. This really does seem like a new paragraph in terms of its subject matter, so Gormally is hardly wrong, but it does make it tricky to join the dots between what Anscombe wrote on the page, how Gormally typed it up, and what has now been published (which does not try to copy Gormally’s order).
  4. On p. 153 section 138 the words “at all” appear in the manuscript after “only one I can remember” but are absent in the published version.
  5. On p. 119 (section 3) the book has “someone said” where the manuscript has “one of the Wittgenstein children said”
  6. On p. 120 (section 5) the book has “used to say that he had” where the MS has “used to say he had”
  7. On p. 121 section 12 the second long dash is a comma in the MS
  8. On p. 121 section 13 the word ‘that’ has been added, which is not in the MS. The MS also has a paragraph break, so that the last sentence is its own paragraph
  9. On p. 121 section 14, the MS has a comma after ‘sister’ and after ‘him’. These are missing from the published version.
  10. On p. 123 section 20 the MS has a comma after Salzer
  11. On p. 123 section 22 the MS has the word ‘very’ before ‘friendly’
  12. On p. 124 section 24 there is a long dash where the MS has a comma
  13. On p. 125 section 28 the first word in the MS looks like ‘On’, not ‘Of’. The published text has ‘with not’ where the MS looks more like ‘without,’ although it’s hard to tell. The MS also has the word ‘that’ after ‘I mean’, which is missing in the book
  14. On p. 126 the text presents Anscombe’s wording as ‘porte-welière’ and explains that this means post-delivery. The original looks to me like porte-cochère.
  15. On p. 129 section 42 the word ‘that’ has been inserted after ‘follow’
  16. On p. 130 section 45 a comma has been inserted after ‘me’
  17. On p. 130 section 46, this paragraph begins with an open parenthesis mark in the MS, although there is no closing mark at the end. The published version omits the opening mark.
  18. On p. 131 section 47 is given the Gormally number 189, but I think it should be 196. Gormally 189 is here section 76 on p. 137.
  19. On p. 131 section 49 the word in the MS looks much more like ‘complimented’ than ‘congratulated’
  20. On p. 132 section 50 three words have been rendered as ‘through whim, say’. This is a plausible guess, the writing being very unclear, but I don’t see a w for ‘whim’. Nor a comma after that word. The first word clearly ends with ‘o’, but would Anscombe have spelled ‘through’ as ‘thro’? Perhaps she did. It almost looks like a name, but not one I can make out. The first word looks like Tyro, Dyno, Truro, Two or possibly Geo. The next two look like “him say” or “Lin say”. Was there a furniture maker called something Linsay?
  21. On p. 133 section 55 the MS has a semi-colon after ‘convent’ instead of a full stop, and the h in the following word (‘He’) is not capitalized. There is also a comma after “pleased by” in the MS.
  22. On p. 134 section 57 ‘things’ is ‘thing’ in the MS
  23. On p. 135 section 63 there is no comma after ‘Something’ in the MS
  24. On p. 136 section 70 the MS says “I can’t remember” rather than simply “can’t remember”
  25. On p. 138 section 77 the word ‘could’ looks more like ‘would’ in the MS, and the word rendered as ‘take’ (which makes the most sense, given the context) looks more like ‘late’. I doubt this is a mistake, except on Anscombe’s part, but it does reflect the difficulty of reading her handwriting sometimes.
  26. On p. 138 section 82 the MS has commas before and after “I remember”
  27. On p. 140 section 89 the MS does not have the word ‘that’ before ‘Russell’
  28. On p. 141 section 96 I think there should be a comma after ‘that’ (line 2)
  29. On p. 142 section 96 I think there should be a comma after ‘badly’
  30. On p. 142 section 99 the question mark after ‘strength’ has been supplied by the editors
  31. On p. 145 section 106 the word given as ‘as’ looks like ‘in’ in the MS
  32. On p. 151 section 130 the final sentence begins a new paragraph in the MS. In fact, each half of the equation starts on a new line
  33. On p. 151 section 131 a comma has been added after ‘saying’
  34. On p. 151 section 133 the MS has a comma after “But of course”
  35. On p. 153 section 138 in the MS it looks as though the word ‘in’ appears after ‘smile’, there is no comma after “savagely serious”, a new paragraph begins with “The only one I can remember” and the words “at all” appear after this ‘remember’. They are absent from the printed text.
  36. On p. 153 section 140 the MS appears to have a comma rather than a full stop after 1944 and then the next word (“he’d”) starts with a lower case h. Anscombe seems to write Moral Science Club, which has been corrected to Moral Sciences Club.
  37. On p. 155 section 144 I think there should be a comma after ‘himself’ and a full stop, rather than a comma, after “Yes”.
  38. On p. 157 section the MS has a comma after ‘came’
  39. On p. 158 section 157 the published text is missing the word ‘quite’ after ‘remember’
  40. On p. 158 section 161 the word ‘a’ has been added before ‘sculptor’ and it looks as though an ‘s’ has been omitted after ‘verb’
  41. On p. 159 section 162 the word ‘that’ has been added between ‘thing’ and ‘Wittgenstein’
  42. On p. 160 section 165 the MS says ‘used to’ but ‘would’ is printed in the book instead
  43. On p. 161 section 170 the MS has a comma after “Oh”
  44. On p. 165 section 183 in the MS it looks to me as though Anscombe has crossed out the ‘s’ at the end of ‘remarks’, which is printed as in the plural
  45. On p. 167 section 189 I think the MS has a colon after ‘replied’
  46. On p. 167 section 190 I think there should be a comma after ‘been’
  47. On p. 168 section 192 the text says “and a lot of stuff in one long false note” whereas the MS appears to say “and a lot of stuff is one long false note”
  48. On p. 169 section 195 the text has “And how would it look as if it looked as if the earth rotated on its axis?” while the MS says “And how would it look if it looked as if the earth rotated on its axis?”
  49. On p. 170 section 198 the MS has a dash while the book has a semi-colon
  50. On p. 171 section 200 a comma has been inserted after ‘time’
  51. On p. 172 section 200 the words “we went’ have been omitted after “four o’clock” and the word ‘quarter’ has been used instead of Anscombe’s ¼
  52. On p. 173 section 201 the MS seems to have “Now try and open your eyes!” rather than “Now try to open your eyes!”
  53. On p. 174 section 202 in the MS there is a comma after ‘why’
  54. On p. 175 section 205 a comma has been added after ‘roar’
  55. On p. 176 section 207 the word ‘an’ has been omitted in “fear of an unforeseeable judgment”
  56. On p. 176 section 208 the MS has a comma after ‘know’
  57. On p. 176 section 209 the MS has a semi-colon, not a comma, after ‘time’ (I think) and a comma after ‘unaffected’
  58. On p. 176 section 210 the word written as ‘train’ looks more like ‘tram’ to me
  59. On p. 178 section 214 the word printed as ‘You’re’ looks in the MS as though it could be ‘Your’ (which would not be wrong—instead of saying “You are saying that you could not lie” Wittgenstein would be saying “About your having said that you could not lie…”
  60. On p. 178 section 215 the book has ‘wouldn’t’ but I think the MS might say ‘couldn’t’
  61. On p. 180 section 221 the word ‘I’ has been omitted between ‘which’ and ‘had’
  62. On p. 184 section 228 I think there should be a comma after ‘listened’
  63. On p. 186 section 234 I think instead of “him saying" it should be “his saying”
None of this matters very much, no doubt, but perhaps someone will care. More details (including a missing paragraph) in the review.

Wednesday, July 30, 2025

Anscombe on Faith and Justice

Another new publication. This one is short, open access, and quotes unpublished letters to von Wright. 

Abstract

In G. E. M. Anscombe’s extensive correspondence with G. H. von Wright, one of the many topics that come up is the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. What she says in these letters is significant because of the interest in what she wrote elsewhere about the use of atomic weapons. It is especially interesting because she might seem to imply here that only a person with religious faith is capable of being just. This paper quotes the relevant passages from the correspondence, explores what she might have meant, and concludes that she is not committed to the view that only the faithful can be just.

Wednesday, May 7, 2025

Wittgenstein Versus Anscombe on How to Live

My next book is now available to pre-order here. Here's a description of the contents:

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) and Elizabeth Anscombe (1919–2001) are two of the most interesting and influential philosophers of the twentieth century. Anscombe was Wittgenstein's friend and student, chosen by him to be his translator and editor, but the two had very different views on ethics and religion. Anscombe was a devout Catholic, while Wittgenstein was much less traditional. Each cared passionately about living the right way, and each was noted for their eccentricity. Why did they live as they did? What did they have to say about how one ought to live? And what, if anything, can we learn from them? This book explores their different beliefs about killing in war, about sexuality, about politics, about God, and about the meaning of life. Drawing on previously unpublished work by Anscombe, Duncan Richter explains where these beliefs came from, how they affected the lives of these two great philosophers, and some of the strengths and weaknesses of their divergent positions. If we understand these two thinkers better, we may improve our own chances of living a good life.

Saturday, February 22, 2025

Sheer Poison? Anscombe and Wittgenstein on Philosophy of Religion

I have a new, open access publication available here. It's part of a special issue on New Work on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion edited by Sebastian Sunday Grève.

Abstract 

Anscombe once said to Anthony Kenny that “On the topic of religion, Wittgenstein is sheer poison”. This paper offers an assessment of that view. I take it that Anscombe meant that Wittgenstein was a bad influence rather than that his views were necessarily false, although she seems to have been uncertain about what exactly his views were. In “Paganism, Superstition and Philosophy”, she identifies five ideas that make up “a certain current in philosophy which has a strong historical connection with Wittgenstein”. I identify some of the sources of these ideas, in Wittgenstein’s writing and in work by some of his followers, and consider what Anscombe’s objections to them might have been. I also look at whether we should think of these ideas as belonging either to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion or to his personal beliefs. This will involve some consideration of how far we can, or should try to, separate the personal from the philosophical. So far as he held objectionable views about religion, I argue that these ought to be considered personal rather than philosophical.

Tuesday, October 15, 2024

Sally Rooney's Intermezzo

Sally Rooney’s new novel is possibly her best yet. It’s hard for me to judge, since it’s so relevant to topics I have a special interest in, which makes it appeal to me in ways it might not to others.

I take Intermezzo to be primarily about what to do concerning sex (and religion) in this age that might seem to lie between the age of Anscombe’s Catholic Christianity (at least in Rooney’s Ireland) and whatever is to come. It could also be read as a consideration of the differences between Anscombe’s traditional views on sex and religion and Wittgenstein’s still demanding but much less traditional views. He believed in God in some sense and was a Christian, at least in his own mind, in some sense, but he was nowhere near as orthodox or clear in his views as she was, and he considered Anscombe to be narrow-minded. He was somewhere in the LGBTQIA+ realm, especially the G, B, and A parts of that ballpark. 

Why call the novel Intermezzo if that is what it is about? One of the main characters in the book, Ivan Koubek, is a chess-player.  Ryan Ruby points out that intermezzo has a chess-related meaning in his review here.

Wikipedia explains this meaning as follows:

The zwischenzug is a chess tactic in which a player, instead of playing the expected move (commonly a recapture), first interposes another move posing an immediate threat that the opponent must answer, and only then plays the expected move. It is a move that has a high degree of "initiative". Ideally, the zwischenzug changes the situation to the player's advantage, such as by gaining material or avoiding what would otherwise be a strong continuation for the opponent.

 

This kind of move is also called an intermezzo or an in-between move. More commonly, ‘intermezzo’ means a short dramatic composition or piece of music that comes between two other, longer pieces. It sounds to me as though it could refer simply to something that comes between two other things or, in chess, to the messy period in dialectical progress that comes before what will later be evident progress.

So what does this have to do with Anscombe? I have mentioned Ivan Koubek already. His brother Peter and his ex/girlfriend Sylvia Larkin are two more major characters. Peter’s and Sylvia’s relationship is complicated, originally because of an accident she suffered a few years earlier. An overheard conversation between doctors includes this information:

 

History of chronic refractory pain following traumatic injury. Road traffic accident. […] The old life of pleasure gone and never returning. (p. 14)

 

The “old life of pleasure” that has gone includes her sex life.

Compare this with the ending of Anscombe’s paper “You Can have Sex without Children: Christianity and the New Offer” (in her Collected Papers Volume III, pp. 82-96). Speaking of sexual intercourse with the intention not of performing “a generative type of act” but for one or both of the people involved to achieve orgasm, she asks:  

 

if it is indeed all right to do this for good ends, then it is excessively difficult to see why after all the act need closely resemble a normal complete act of copulation; supposing that to have been made very difficult, say by a crippling accident to the wife, why should the couple not achieve sexual climax by mutual stimulation, rather than hold themselves obliged to a heroic degree of continence?  

 

A large part of what Intermezzo is about is what Peter and Sylvia, or any couple in this situation, should do. Since they are not already married, my understanding is, the Catholic view is that they should not get married.

 

Code of Canon Law in section 1084:

 §1. Antecedent and perpetual impotence to have intercourse, whether on the part of the man or the woman, whether absolute or relative, nullifies marriage by its very nature. (Quoted from https://www.catholic.com/magazine/online-edition/why-the-church-cannot-marry-the-impotent)

 

They should either stay single, holding themselves to what might be considered a heroic degree of continence, or Peter should find someone else to marry.

This is roughly the position taken by Sylvia. Her relationship with Peter will not work, she believes, so he should find someone else. She says this not on religious grounds, although those might be lurking in the background, and not really sincerely. In reality, they both still love each other and want to be together, although their lives get even more complicated when Peter falls in love with one of the other women he dates. What to do about this (kind of) situation is another big question that the novel raises without really answering.

Philip Larkin is quoted in the novel early on, and Sylvia’s sharing his last name is probably not just a coincidence. The quotation is from “Church Going,” a poem about an atheist’s feeling the pull of religion, or at least a church. Here’s how it ends, including the bit that Rooney quotes:

 

[…] though I've no idea

What this accoutred frowsty barn is worth,

It pleases me to stand in silence here;

 

A serious house on serious earth it is,

In whose blent air all our compulsions meet,

Are recognised, and robed as destinies.

And that much never can be obsolete,

Since someone will forever be surprising

A hunger in himself to be more serious,

And gravitating with it to this ground,

Which, he once heard, was proper to grow wise in,

If only that so many dead lie round.

 

Ruby writes:

 

Rooney’s engagement with Christianity in her fiction is less-often remarked on, but far more prevalent [than Marxism in her fiction]. Sylvia has a ‘sincere and transcendent love of Christ’, which is sometimes also a ‘terrifyingly real and serious fear of Christ’. Margaret ‘seems to feel obscurely that the day she met Ivan, they brought into existence a new relationship’, and that, ‘in the eyes of God’, her loyalty to this new ‘way of being’ may demand sacrifices of her, including ‘her pride, her dignity, her life itself’. When she asks Ivan if he believes in God, Ivan articulates a theory of divinity as a kind of aesthetic principle.

 

Beauty, or at least beauty of a certain kind, Ivan explains, makes him think there is a meaning behind everything. He connects this with belief in God.

Near the end of the novel Peter and Ivan each describe themselves as trying to believe in God.

Ruby also quotes a character (it’s Sylvia as registered in Peter’s consciousness, I think) referring to the “Sense that nothing can mean anything anymore, aesthetically.” Anscombe says something very similar. I have in mind especially things she says in an unpublished document which I don’t have permission to quote here, but also her claim in a 1972 letter to The Human World that, according to contemporary literature, “we are all crawling around in shit, that all is hopeless and absurd.” Sylvia is a bit like Anscombe, but not exactly like her. She doesn’t believe what Anscombe believes, and is at least somewhat open to possibilities that Anscombe rejects.

Rooney does not preach, but she does suggest some options to consider. One of these is that we do not yet have the concepts we need to think very well about all this. Perhaps our ideas of God will do, but our ideas about love and sex might need some revision. Here Rooney sounds a bit like Paulina Sliwa. Sliwa introduces the notion of what she calls hermeneutical inquiry, which she characterizes as making sense of the situation one is in. (See Paulina Sliwa “Making Sense of Things: Moral Inquiry as Hermeneutical Inquiry” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2023, pp. 1-21.) For instance, a woman who has been raped (the example Sliwa focuses on) might take some time to realize this. Partly this could be because one is reluctant to acknowledge such a repellent truth, but it might also be because one associates certain ideas with rape (a stranger in an alley or overt threats of violence, for instance) and one’s own case might not match these stereotypes.

 

This is not simply a matter of working out “how to conceptualise one’s experience” though, Sliwa argues. Rather, it is a matter of trying to find a perspective on one’s experience:

 

A perspective is a complex set of interconnected cognitive, affective, and motivational dispositions: dispositions to find salient, to be moved by, to see as explanatorily or morally significant, to see a situation as similar to or different from another. A perspective is thus a way of making sense of a situation. (p. 2)

 

The confused rape victim does not lack the word or concept ‘rape’. Nor is it that she suffers from “uncertainty about which option from a menu is the correct one” (p. 5). Rather, she is confused and needs to find “a different way of looking and feeling about the subject matter at hand” (p. 5). The idea that what has happened to her is rape might not occur to her until some way into her attempt to make sense of things. And when that idea does occur to her, it might well not be immediately obvious that ‘rape’ is the right word to use. So she isn’t simply at a loss for words. She is engaged in an intellectual process that will, if successful, result in her learning something about her situation.

What she needs is to find the right, most apt, perspective, Sliwa says. Perspectives are not just words or concepts, but they are expressed by words. For instance, one perspective on what has happened is expressed by the words “dealing with an asshole” (p. 12). Another is expressed by “rape.” I think this point might be expressible in terms of conceptualization, but, if so, Sliwa is surely right that this is not a simple matter of hitting on the right word.

 

Rooney has a similar idea about choosing a name for something from a given assortment of options. She talks about what Peter and Sylvia are as:

 

A philosophical problem. When they go out together, to be mistaken for what they aren’t. Or rather: to be mistaken for what they are. And how is that possible. To see a man and a woman walking together: to name in the mind their relationship to one another, as it were automatically. Which is to select from the assortment of existing names the one that seems appropriate to the particular case. To say to oneself that in relation to the man, this particular woman must be a friend, or else a girlfriend, or a wife, or sister. An act of naming which stands open to correction, but correction only in the form of replacement: that is, the replacement of one existing name for another. If you are mistaken in thinking this woman my friend, that means merely that you have chosen the wrong term from the assortment, and therefore that I can correct you by supplying the appropriate one in its place. The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, says Wittgenstein, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent. Because the name you give to a presumed relation between a man and woman may be both correct and incorrect at once. Each name including within itself a complex of assumptions. (p. 400)

 

Rooney quotes Wittgenstein here, but she might equally have quoted Iris Murdoch (who, like Anscombe, was also born in Ireland). Murdoch writes:

 

if we consider what the work of attention is like, how continuously it goes on, and how imperceptibly it builds up structures of value round about us, we shall not be surprised that at crucial moments of choice most of the business of choosing is already over. (“The Idea of Perfection” in Existentialists and Mystics, p. 329.)

 

Contemporary sexual ethics seems to be a bit of a mess, in the sense that a lot of people seem to be unhappy about what is expected or what actually happens or both. Women continue to be treated badly. There is a lot of involuntary celibacy. More people seem to want to get married than actually manage to do so. Dating is often said to be an unpleasant or disappointing experience. Whether we would do best to go back to traditional values or press on with the current ones or find something new seems to be a live question.

What we need might be new names or new complexes of assumptions. Which, as Rooney (or Peter) notes, is a social as well as a philosophical problem. And for that we would need to pay attention, thinking both carefully and imaginatively. In the meantime, in this intermission between the moral world that Anscombe (and most of Ireland) lived in and some possible new one that might be to come, we have to struggle to make sense of how we live and ought to live, including what to call things. (Assuming, that is, that we don’t simply agree with Anscombe. But Rooney seems to take this for granted.) Rooney’s contribution to the struggle is bringing up the apparent need for it, and getting us started on exploring some options, drawing the attention that is needed to at least some of the places where it needs to go.

Monday, September 12, 2022

The Creation of Wittgenstein

 

Table of Contents

ABBREVIATIONS
1. Introduction, Thomas Wallgren (University of Helsinki, Finland)

Part I: Portraits of Wittgenstein's Literary Heirs
2. Rush Rhees: “Discussion is my Only Medicine” , Lars Hertzberg (Åbo Academy University, Finland)
3. A Portrait of Elizabeth Anscombe, Duncan Richter (Virginia Military Institute, USA)
4. Georg Henrik von Wright – A Biographical Sketch, Bernt Österman (University of Helsinki, Finland)

Part II: Understanding the Editors' Contributions to the Wittgenstein Scholars Have Known and the Philosophical Implications of their Achievement
5. The Letters which Rush Rhees, Elizabeth Anscombe, and Georg Henrik von Wright Sent to
Each Other, Christian Erbacher (University of Siegen, Germany)
6. The Revision of Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Kim Solin (University of Helsinki, Finland)
7. Naked, Please! Elizabeth Anscombe as Translator and Editor of Wittgenstein, Joel Backström (University of Helsinki, Finland)
8. From A Collection of Aphorisms to the Setting of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy: G.H. Von Wright's Work on Wittgenstein's General Remarks, Bernt Österman (University of Helsinki, Finland)
9. “… Finding and Inventing Intermediate Links”: On Rhees and the Preparation and Publication of Bemerkungen Über Frazers “The Golden Bough”, Peter K. Westergaard (University of Copenhagen, Denmark)
10. Editorial Approaches to Wittgenstein's “Last Writings” (1949–51): Elizabeth Anscombe, G.H. von Wright and Rush Rhees in Dialogue, Lassi Jakola (University of Helsinki, Finland)
11. Art's Part in Wittgenstein's Philosophy, Hanne Appelqvist (Helsinki Institute for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland)
12. Unearthing the Socratic Wittgenstein, Thomas Wallgren (University of Helsinki, Finland)

APPENDIX 1:
Wittgenstein's Will. Facsimilie of G.H. von Wright's exemplar, kept at WWA.
APPENDIX 2:
Table of Writings Published Postuhumously with Ludwig Wittgenstein Named as Author and at Least One of the Following As Editor: Rush Rhees. G.E.M. Anscombe, G.H. Von Wright. Created By Rickard Nylund In Cooperation With Thomas Wallgren.
BIBILIOGRAPHY
- Compiled by Patrik Forss in cooperation with Thomas Wallgren.
NOTE ON ARCHIVAL RESOURCES
- Compiled by Anna Lindelöf in cooperation with Bernt Österman and Thomas Wallgren.

Available for pre-order here.

Wednesday, August 10, 2022

The Oxford Handbook of Elizabeth Anscombe

 


Introduction, Roger Teichmann
Part I: Intention
1. 'On Anscombe on Practical Knowledge and Practical Truth,' Lucy Campbell
2. 'Intention with Which,' Charles F. Capps
3. 'Intention, Knowledge and responsibility,' Rémi Clot-Goudard
4. '"Practical knowledge" and testimony, Johannes Roessler

Part II: Ethical Theory
5. 'Anscombe's Three Theses After Sixty Years: modern moral philosophy, polemic, and "Modern Moral Philosophy,"' Sophie Grace Chappell
6. 'Practical Truth, Ethical Naturalism, and the Constitution of Agency in Anscombe's Ethics,' John Hacker-Wright
7. 'Criterialism and Contextualism,' Gavin Lawrence
8. 'Anscombe on Double Effect and Intended Consequences,' Cyrille Michon
9. 'Anscombe on Ought,' Anselm Mueller

Part III: Human Life
10.'Justice and Murder: The Backstory to Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy,"' John Berkman
11. 'Anscombe on euthanasia as murder,' David A. Jones
12. 'The Knowledge of Human Dignity,' Micah Lott
13. 'Life and Other Basic Rights in Anscombe,' Katharina Nieswandt
14. 'Anscombe: Sexual Ethics,' Duncan Richter
15. 'Linguistic idealism and human essence,' Rachael Wiseman

Part IV: The First Person
16. 'The first person, self-consciousness and action,' Valerie Aucouturier
17. 'Anscombe and Self-consciousness,' Adrian Haddock
18. 'The first person and "The First person,"' Harold Noonan

Part V: Anscombe on/and Other Philosophers
19. 'Anscombe's Wittgenstein,' Joel Backström
20. 'Anscombe and Aquinas,' John Haldane
21. 'Ethics and Action Theory: An Unhappy Divorce,' Constantine Sandis
22. 'Anscombe and Wittgenstein on Knowledge "without Observation,"' Harold Teichman

Thursday, March 11, 2021

Moral Philosophy and Moral Life

Review of Moral Philosophy and Moral Life by Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen, Oxford University Press, 2020

 

I was hoping that someone would ask me to review this book, but they didn’t, so I’m just reviewing it for my own sake. If I read a book without writing about it, it tends to go in one ear and out the other. I’d like this one to stay in my head.

Roughly speaking, the book is a kind of synthesis of all the best work (e.g. by Iris Murdoch, John McDowell, Alice Crary, Bernard Williams, Martha Nussbaum, Stanley Cavell, and Cora Diamond) that has been done in the last seventy years or so on what moral philosophy (aka ethics) is and should be.  This makes it sound like a compilation, which in a way it is, but only in the sense that the great pyramids are piles of rocks. Christensen seems to have read everything worth reading on the subject (which is a lot), understood it all (which is rare), and seen how best to fit it all together, including where to make necessary cuts, additions and adjustments. Respect for Christensen (and myself) requires critical engagement with her ideas and arguments, so I’ll try not simply to agree with everything she says, but I can’t muster much disagreement. In what follows I’ll try to provide a sense of what the book is about by questing, Quixote-style, for something to take issue with. Or, to put it perhaps less absurdly, I will try to apply some Cartesian acid of doubt and see what remains. The bottom line is that it is very acid-resistant. The second to bottom line is that I am going to get very nit-picky at times, but you should remember if you read on that my attempts to find fault all fail. In short, it’s a very good book indeed.

The nature of the work is reflected in the cover, which shows what I think is EgonSchiele’s “House with Shingles”. The house looks as though it has been added to over time, perhaps by different owners, so that there is a sense of the work of construction’s having been done collectively and not all at once. It is a large and appealing house. Similarly, Christensen’s work brings together ideas and arguments from various philosophers, mostly from recent years but going back as far as Aristotle. She combines them to create a capacious and attractive account of what moral philosophy should be, and how it can relate to our moral lives.

Christensen’s goal, which is in some ways more modest than her title might suggest, is “to present a suggestion for a renewed conception of moral philosophy that is valuable in its own right and may also influence debates about the role of moral theories and moral philosophy in relation to our moral lives.” (p. 3) What her book is responding to, without necessarily claiming to provide a complete response, is: “The challenge […] to present a substantial alternative that can replace the twentieth-century view of moral philosophy as a theory-developing science. “ (p. 6)

Instead of telling us what to do, or providing some sort of mechanism for producing such instruction, moral philosophy should be descriptive, she argues. This might seem disappointingly unhelpful, but she offers a nice description of how moral philosophy could be useful even while being purely descriptive and (in some sense) leaving everything as it is:

philosophy works on our attention, to give us a clearer view of moral life but also to bring us to notice what we tend to overlook, or what we have never before noticed as being of moral importance. Moral philosophy aids our orientation in moral life in a way that is somewhat similar to the way that for example maps, roads signs, aerial photographs and written descriptions may help our orientation in a landscape, and a descriptive approach is in this way meant to enable an understanding of moral life that reveals its many different features and their vital importance to us. (p. 10)

Later she says that “there are at least three ways in which descriptive moral philosophy is practical, namely in furthering our moral orientation, our moral attention, and our moral development” (p. 201) Such description is not neutral, as might be thought. It is itself a moral task, requiring a sense of what matters to moral thinking and moral life.

Her argument for rejecting the idea of moral philosophy as (nothing but) normative theory begins with the fact that both Iris Murdoch and Elizabeth Anscombe posed serious challenges to this conception of moral philosophy in the 1950s (specifically Murdoch’s “Vision and Choice” in 1956 and Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” in 1958). Summarizing what she sees as the key points of these papers, at least as far as her immediate project goes, Christensen notes that:

both Murdoch and Anscombe criticise contemporary moral philosophers for being unduly generalising, for reacting to the lack of an authoritative moral framework by seeking a foundation where no foundation is available and for simply dressing up their own favourite moral prejudices and conventions as moral theories. These criticisms have resounded through moral philosophy since the two pioneering articles were published (p. 19)

The fact that criticisms have been made does not mean much on its own, of course, but the response has not been sufficiently impressive. Martha Nussbaum’s defence of moral theory, or moral philosophy as moral theory, for instance, fails to address some criticisms of moral theory, instead focusing on what would amount to criticisms only of bad theory. Or so Christensen argues. For instance, Nussbaum mentions the criticism that moral theory offers crude guidance, which Christensen seems to take to mean that theory allegedly gives bad advice, which it sort of does, but I think maybe Nussbaum’s idea, or the idea she is trying to capture and defend theory against, is that theory gives overly simple or insufficiently nuanced advice, such as never lie or always return weapons you have borrowed to their legal owner. Some critics of moral theory think it is in the nature of a moral theory that it will always be liable to problems of this sort, which involve undesirable inflexibility in response to the details of particular circumstances. In this sense, allegedly, even the best moral theory—not only a bad one—will give crude advice. (Whereas Christensen writes that: “Nussbaum says that moral theory is criticised for giving ‘crude guidance’, but it seems unlikely that this point would be raised by theory-critics; it is rather a point of criticism that a proponent of one theory would raise against another, different and competing theory” (p.33.)) So it is possible that Christensen has misconstrued Nussbaum’s point here—though also possible that she hasn’t (it might just as well be me who is misconstruing Christensen)—but Christensen has much more to say against Nussbaum’s defence of theory, and she takes up (and defends) precisely this kind of concern about inflexibility later in the book. In other words, if she is wrong here then it doesn’t matter in the end.

The strongest pro-theory kind of view “allows theory to require revisions in our moral understanding if such an understanding does not correspond to the theory’s requirements” (p. 37) Against this view, Christensen draws on the work of Bernard Williams, who:

opposes the strong view of the authority of moral theory on the grounds that we cannot provide a universally justified foundation of theory that would authorise a revision of our moral convictions, to which he adds the stronger point that the aim of moral thought is not to live up to certain theoretical requirements, for example that of internal consistency, but to allow us to build a framework for a liveable life. (p. 37)

To this she adds a point from Julia Annas:

we should be very sceptical of any conception of morality according to which what is required of us morally is that we should act or think in accordance with standards imposed on us from outside. This idea is problematic because it misconstrues a basic feature of the moral, namely that we always ourselves bear responsibility for making our own judgements, and thus it seems likely to impede the development of our own abilities of moral discernment, judgement, and critique. (p. 37)

I wasn’t immediately sure that I agreed with Annas about this. It’s true that we are responsible for making our own judgments, but must we be very skeptical of conceptions of morality that see standards as being imposed on us from outside? For instance, as being commanded by God? Or as being required by what we might call the nature of things? Where, for instance, does the idea come from that I must not thwart your will for the sake of my own? Perhaps ‘nowhere’ is the right answer (we shouldn’t be looking for a place if we want to understand the source of ethics), but ‘from our community’ or ‘from your reality as a fellow being’ seem like reasonable attempts at an answer. Christensen shows considerable sympathy for the former of these answers (‘from our community’), at least, so once again I don’t think I’m seriously disagreeing with her here. A lot probably depends on exactly what meaning, or what weight, we put on the words ‘standards’ and ‘imposed’. To the extent that I adopt a standard, I don’t get to use the excuse that it was imposed on me by my parents or society (or God). And, even more in Annas’s and Christensen’s favor, Annas is talking about the kind of moral theory that offers a decision procedure to tell you what to do. (See Annas p.33, here.) So it’s a particular kind of standard imposed from outside that she is arguing against (or a particular sense of ‘outside’, one enabling the shifting of blame or shirking of responsibility, that is problematic), and this is the very kind of thing that Christensen is arguing against too. So, once again, there is nothing to disagree with here after all.

Another point I wondered about is Christensen’s use of Lars Hertzberg’s argument against moral expertise:

a moral question—Hertzberg’s example is that of a woman considering whether she should have an abortion—is always a question for a particular person in a particular situation, and the answer will always have to consider this context. In the example, the woman’s answer will have to take into account her specific moral commitments and her particular situation, and her decision should be shaped by the way she relates to this type of moral question as well as her commitments and values. This also means that even if the woman finds that she has reached the right decision about what to do, we will find it understandable if she is still reluctant to claim that her reasons are valid or authoritative for other women facing a similar choice. Even if another person finds that the woman’s decision is the right one, she may still not be able to make the same decision, to integrate it into her own life, to live that kind of life. (p. 39)

I agree that, “Because of the normative character of moral questions, the answers to such questions are to be judged by moral standards, for example whether our answers express something that we are seriously committed to and that we have integrated into our moral lives.” (p. 39). And the idea that a moral question is always a particular question for a particular person sounds right. But can’t we, nevertheless, oppose all actions of a certain kind (slavery, torture, etc.)? At least in advance of finding ourselves in some especially terrible situation that makes us question even our most basic moral commitments? For instance, isn’t it possibly commendable for someone to be committed to the Ten Commandments in a way that resists adding anything to them about context?

Take the examples of being committed never to lie and being committed never to discriminate against a member of a disadvantaged minority on the grounds of race. (See, e.g., Roger Teichmann here.) It is true that exactly what one does will always take into account the particular situation one is in. How could it not? But if we were to add words like “always taking the specific context into account” to these commitments the effect would seem to be either nothing at all (in which case why add them?) or else a dilution of the commitment itself, as if an excuse for breaching it were being built in. Which is not to say that either Hertzberg or Christensen is wrong, but it is to say something about how I think their points ought to be taken. We need to contextualize contextualization, perhaps, or at least not take arguments for considering things in context out of the context in which those arguments occur.

With that in mind, maybe I should address the original example of abortion. I have introduced other examples because I agree with Hertzberg and Christensen when it comes to abortion. But I think this means that I disagree morally with pro-life people on this issue, not that they are missing some general, purely philosophical, point about the importance of context.      

Still, I agree with Hertzberg’s and Christensen’s larger point that, “The idea of moral expertise seems attractive to us, because it allows us to engage in a form of moral escapism by offering us a way in which we can avoid confronting our fundamental moral responsibility for our decisions.” (p. 39) And since the example of the woman wondering about having an abortion was brought up precisely in order to support this idea about moral expertise, I don’t think I count as really disagreeing with what Christensen is saying here at all.

She has more to say about general moral principles later in the book: “Even if general principles play a role in coming to the right moral understanding of a situation and thus to the right moral decision, the application of moral principles will always rely on some form of judgement of the particular case at hand.” (p. 77) It is clear that she does not at all deny that general principles have a role to play. Her point is much more that they alone are not enough. And that seems right.

But this is a difficult kind of truth to handle without doing damage, I think, so I want to say a bit more about it. (I don’t think I will be contradicting Christensen here, but the discussion might show what she is doing in a non-obvious and therefore possibly useful light.) What she says about general moral principles makes me think of two examples from Elizabeth Anscombe. One is her saying that “if someone really thinks, in advance, that it is open to question whether such an action as procuring the judicial execution of the innocent should be quite excluded from consideration—I do not want to argue with him; he shows a corrupt mind.” (“Modern Moral Philosophy”) The other is the story that Rosalind Hurtshouse relates about Anscombe describing a real-life case of a woman hiding Jewish people from the Nazis when the SS came to the door. “Clearly, she must not lie,” Anscombe says, shockingly. (The woman feigned madness so as to embarrass the young SS officer, thereby saving her guests and avoiding the sin of lying. See my Anscombe’s Moral Philosophy pp. 21-22 for more.) 

So does Christensen come too close to showing a corrupt mind by saying that “the application of moral principles will always rely on some form of judgement of the particular case at hand”? Does her saying this somehow undermine, if only a little bit, the impressive force of Anscombe’s “Clearly, she must not lie”? (In saying that I think there is impressive force in what Anscombe says I don’t mean that I agree with her. For better or worse, it isn’t clear to me that one must not lie to the SS in those circumstances. But I certainly don’t want to rule out a view like Anscombe’s as somehow illegitimate either morally or philosophically.)

Anscombe’s idea seems to be that a morally healthy mind will not only be guided by certain principles, such as “Thou shalt not bear false witness” and “it is disgraceful to choose an unjust action” (another example from “Modern Moral Philosophy”), but also that it will rely on such ideas as what we might call primary guides. A person with such a mind will not only find that general principles play a role in their moral thinking, albeit one that is informed by personal judgments about particular cases. These principles will likely be the first things that come to mind when she faces a moral problem, and they will be regarded as beyond doubt. They are authoritative, understood as either the literal command of God or at least something analogous to it. Any suggestion that the agent’s own judgment might play a role or that the details of each situation will need to be taken into account, however true the suggestion might be, could be regarded as likely to have a corrupting influence, if only on the philosophically unsophisticated. The uneducated and the insufficiently ethical might be best kept away from any suggestion that God’s commandments are not enough to guarantee right action. This is the kind of truth that Averroes thought best kept to philosophers.

But philosophers are the audience that Christensen is addressing, so I think she is not guilty of the charge of corruption that I am considering here. In fact, Anscombe’s story about how to deal with the SS without lying might be exactly the kind of imaginative thinking in context that Christensen is pointing to when she says that “the application of moral principles will always rely on some form of judgement of the particular case at hand”.    

The point of this detour, apart from helping me think things through, is to bring out the fact that Christensen’s work itself needs to be understood in a certain context and as an intervention in, or contribution to, a particular debate rather than as a flat statement of a-contextual truths. Her skepticism about general principles is skepticism about over-emphasis on the importance of general principles in moral philosophy. It is not primarily about the use of such principles in moral life. And to the extent that it is about such use (I don’t know her views on this), Christensen would admit that this is a moral view of hers, not something that is delivered up by neutral, objective, impartial philosophical reasoning.     

Let’s move on to see if there is anything else one might reasonably disagree with. Christensen says that, “According to Kant, theory has authority over our moral commitments only insofar it explicates what we in fact already adhere to. This means that moral theory cannot test or correct moral practice” (p. 40) But if a theory designed to explicate what we already adhere to finds—or rather, reveals, to our satisfaction—one of our commitments to be out of step with the others, couldn’t this at least suggest that we might reconsider that one commitment? Isn’t this part of the idea of reflective equilibrium, which Christensen endorses early in the book? It turns out that the answer is Yes.

On reflective equilibrium, she goes on to say: “the method of reflective equilibrium is not a method for awarding any kind of impersonal authority to anything, instead, it must begin from authorities I already recognise, and it only awards the result the authority that I reached this result by a process of reflection (a process of reflection that other people might or might not acknowledge to be authoritative for them)” (p. 42)  This seems right to me.

Another question I had concerns this claim, in chapter 4: “For moral reasoning to be successful, we need a comprehensive understanding of the good life of human beings, as stressed by Aristotle and McDowell…” (p. 89) Maybe we need some vague idea of the good life in order to engage in moral reasoning, but do we really need a comprehensive understanding? Well, to answer my own question, what do we (want to) mean by ‘successful’? And by ‘moral reasoning’? What about the person who does not go in for philosophy but thinks that it cannot be anything but shameful to prefer an unjust course of action to a just one? He will therefore do what (he believes) is just, even if it might have bad consequences. Whether this counts as successful will depend at least in part on whether we agree with his choice of action. Which will depend on us and on the particular situation he is in. But we might also say that this does not count as moral reasoning, because he in a sense rejects the idea of reasoning about what to do in this (kind of) case. He does think a bit, but perhaps not enough for what he does to count as moral reasoning.

Once again, I think there will only seem to be a problem here—if there does seem to be a problem—if we take this quotation out of context. What Christensen is doing is making a list of features that the ideal moral reasoner will have. The list includes an understanding of the good life for a human being, the ability to perceive without prejudice or selfishness, and imagination. She does not imply that no one could ever think well about a given ethical question unless they had all of these desirable qualities to the highest possible degree. 

She has a lot more to say about all this, though, and it is worth looking at some of it here:

We require of sound and reflective moral reasoning that it arises from a coherent understanding of how to live to which the person in question is implicitly or explicitly committed. It is however important not to confuse the criteria for consistency with those of coherence. Where consistency requires generalisation and complete uniformity, coherence can allow for gradations and context-dependence, and moral reasoning can involve descriptions, narratives, metaphors, exemplary experiences, and so on, as that which establishes the coherence of a view of life. The criteria for sound moral reflection are not formal or theoretical, but rather themselves moral, and standards not just of the coherence but also of the sensitivity and conscientiousness of the judgements which flow from this form of reflection. Moreover, as these criteria concern a person’s ‘understanding of how to live a moral life’, they also allow for considerable individual variety with regard to what is given weight in moral reflection... (pp. 92-93)

My first reaction to this is to ask, do we require this? That sounds a bit demanding. But then “arises from” allows for some wiggle room. And to be implicitly committed to an understanding of how to live also allows for some interpretative maneuvering or difference of understanding. There’s something slightly mercurial here, but I think maybe she’s right, and that getting the truth right here just does inevitably involve a kind of oscillating movement that might seem deceptive to unsympathetic or insufficiently careful readers. We do require coherent understanding of some kind, at least in the sense that incoherence and misunderstanding are certainly undesirable. What might seem evasive is perhaps just a recognition of what exactly this means—partly, of how little it means. It isn’t nothing, but it doesn’t involve the onerous commitment that it might sound as though it brings. As Christensen says, the criteria are themselves moral, so they are no more demanding than morality itself. And there isn’t some neutral, objective thing called philosophy that dictates what they are or ought to be

This subtle, dialectical motion between something that sounds rigorous or demanding and recognition of flexibility and variety is something that Christensen is explicit about, and it is reflected in the way she writes. She often uses the first person singular, but she also uses the plural, and often writes in an impersonal way (e.g. “The work done in this chapter is in line with this criticism, but the main aim is to move beyond criticism and provide a sketch of how and to what extent particular features of our moral lives take on moral importance,” p. 103). This could no doubt be solely for the sake of variety, but it also reflects what she calls “the Wittgensteinian idea that moral philosophy develops in a movement back and forth between the general and theoretical on the one hand and the particular and concrete on the other” (p. 105). There is the work, there is our work, and there is Christensen’s work, each of which is the same project, but seen from different points of view. The reader is invited to join in, as happens in Plato’s, Descartes’s, and Wittgenstein’s work, albeit with little chance of going off in a different direction. That’s books for you, of course, but it’s also because the argument is a very strong current to swim against.

Even so, surely I disagree with Christensen when she disagrees with me? Here’s where that happens:

In a conversation with the Vienna circle, Wittgenstein commented on his own ‘A Lecture on Ethics’: ‘At the end of my lecture on ethics I spoke in the first person. I think that this is something very essential. Here is nothing to be stated anymore; all I can do is to step forward as an individual and speak in the first person’ (WVC 117). Some interpreters have taken this remark as a rejection of the possibility of doing philosophical work with regard to the moral, but this conclusion is premature.[footnote] What Wittgenstein is saying is rather that when we leave moral philosophy, that is, the philosophical activity of trying to describe morally relevant ways of talking, which he is doing for most of the lecture, it is important to change perspective from the third to the first person, because we then turn to an exploration of actual moral importance that is tied to the positions of actual human beings. (p. 112)

The footnote mentions me as an example of such an interpreter.

In my defence, when Wittgenstein engages in the philosophical activity of trying to describe morally relevant ways of talking he concludes that it can’t be done, or perhaps rather that morally relevant ways of talking are all nonsensical. To try to talk ethics is to talk nonsense, he says, and to talk about ethics is to point this out. He might be wrong, and his later self might have disagreed with what he said here, but I don’t think the author of the Lecture on Ethics thought there was anything more to be said about ethics. There’s no sense in that lecture that if only he had more time he could say a lot more. At least it doesn’t seem so to me.

But I agree with the last sentence quoted above. He has been doing moral philosophy for most of the lecture, diagnosing ethical talk (or whatever we want to call it) as nonsense. And then he talks in the first person. He does not consider this to be doing philosophy. Perhaps he should, but he doesn’t. So then I think the disagreement is that I have said that nothing can be said about ethics, that no moral philosophy can be done, according to the author of the Lecture on Ethics, and Christensen is pointing out that the lecture itself is surely intended to be a work of moral philosophy. And I think I have to agree with that.       

Most of her argument is presented by way of other people’s views, carefully explained and quoted, (she even presents some of her own ideas by way of a discussion of Oskari Kuusela’s similar thinking), but she also offers criticisms of her own of people she largely disagrees with (e.g. Onora O’Neill and Martha Nussbaum on theory) and people she mostly agrees with (e.g. Margaret Urban Walker).

One of the people she mostly, but not entirely, agrees with is Raimond Gaita. In a discussion about how a slave owner might some to see a slave as fully human (rightly correcting Gaita’s apparent overlooking of this possibility), Christensen says that the slave owner’s wife might become jealous (the owner has raped the slave) and her jealousy could “open the slave owner’s eyes to how the slave is indeed an intelligible object of love and thus an intelligible object of jealousy” (p. 164). The idea seems to be that the slave owner thinks something like: if my wife is jealous of the slave I have been raping then that slave must be an intelligible object of love. This does seem possible. And that is all that Christensen claims.

But, if I can respond to what I think she might seem to be implying, I don’t think the possibility of jealousy necessarily implies the possibility of love. The slave owner and his wife might agree that of course he could never love the slave, and yet the slave owner’s wife might still feel jealous. She might dimly sense some possibility of love even while denying this possibility. Or she might think that some feeling that is not quite love could exist between them, this feeling being too close to real love for her comfort. Still, as I say, to say this is not to contradict what Christensen actually says. And it pales into complete insignificance against the achievement of improving on work as good as Gaita’s. (Stanley Cavell gets similar treatment too.)

Christensen says at the end of the book that she feels unable to summarize what she has done in it, and I sympathize. It’s a very careful thinking through of a large body of already very thoughtful work, a thinking through that combines synthesis, criticism, and construction. It’s very hard to disagree with any of it, but it also isn’t really the kind of thing you can just agree with and then leave behind. It’s a work that delivers not results so much (e.g. proven theories) as a clearer vision of what moral philosophy ought to be, what it means to live a moral life, and how the two relate to each other. Agreeing with it means henceforth going on in a certain kind of way when one does ethics and attempts to live ethically. We’ll see how that goes.

Thursday, April 2, 2020

Cat videos

My paper on Anscombe on intention in animals has been read and reviewed by Noah Greenstein here:


In the review he mentions a video of a cat stalking a bird, which is worth watching even if you don't care about the philosophy aspect of it all. Here it is: