Anscombe on Wittgenstein

I have a review forthcoming in Philosophical Investigations of John Berkman's and Roger Teichmann's Anscombe on Wittgenstein: Reminiscences of a Philosophical Friendship. The book is great, especially for the reminiscences from Anscombe (which she titled "Anecdotes"). But the published text differs in places from the original manuscript. Handwriting being what it is, it isn't always easy to be sure, but I think there about sixty places where the mansucript is slightly different from what has been published (which is based on a typescript produced by Luke Gormally, who numbered the paragraphs). It seemed pedantic to list these in the review, but perhaps some people will want to see them, so I thought I would publish them here. (In case you're wondering, I have read the original manuscript and took photos of it all, which I compared with the book.) OK, here's the list:

1. On p. 121 section 13, last sentence (“He was regarded with some awe in his own family.”) is a separate paragraph in the original.
2. Gormally's paragraph 72 begins on the same line as the last sentence of 71. I.e., Anscombe writes as if these are part of the same long paragraph.
3. Similarly, Gormally’s 154 begins on the same line as the end of his 153. This really does seem like a new paragraph in terms of its subject matter, so Gormally is hardly wrong, but it does make it tricky to join the dots between what Anscombe wrote on the page, how Gormally typed it up, and what has now been published (which does not try to copy Gormally’s order).
4. On p. 153 section 138 the words “at all” appear in the manuscript after “only one I can remember” but are absent in the published version.
5. On p. 119 (section 3) the book has “someone said” where the manuscript has “one of the Wittgenstein children said”
6. On p. 120 (section 5) the book has “used to say that he had” where the MS has “used to say he had”
7. On p. 121 section 12 the second long dash is a comma in the MS
8. On p. 121 section 13 the word ‘that’ has been added, which is not in the MS. The MS also has a paragraph break, so that the last sentence is its own paragraph
9. On p. 121 section 14, the MS has a comma after ‘sister’ and after ‘him’. These are missing from the published version.
10. On p. 123 section 20 the MS has a comma after Salzer
11. On p. 123 section 22 the MS has the word ‘very’ before ‘friendly’
12. On p. 124 section 24 there is a long dash where the MS has a comma
13. On p. 125 section 28 the first word in the MS looks like ‘On’, not ‘Of’. The published text has ‘with not’ where the MS looks more like ‘without,’ although it’s hard to tell. The MS also has the word ‘that’ after ‘I mean’, which is missing in the book
14. On p. 126 the text presents Anscombe’s wording as ‘porte-welière’ and explains that this means post-delivery. The original looks to me like porte-cochère.
15. On p. 129 section 42 the word ‘that’ has been inserted after ‘follow’
16. On p. 130 section 45 a comma has been inserted after ‘me’
17. On p. 130 section 46, this paragraph begins with an open parenthesis mark in the MS, although there is no closing mark at the end. The published version omits the opening mark.
18. On p. 131 section 47 is given the Gormally number 189, but I think it should be 196. Gormally 189 is here section 76 on p. 137.
19. On p. 131 section 49 the word in the MS looks much more like ‘complimented’ than ‘congratulated’
20. On p. 132 section 50 three words have been rendered as ‘through whim, say’. This is a plausible guess, the writing being very unclear, but I don’t see a w for ‘whim’. Nor a comma after that word. The first word clearly ends with ‘o’, but would Anscombe have spelled ‘through’ as ‘thro’? Perhaps she did. It almost looks like a name, but not one I can make out. The first word looks like Tyro, Dyno, Truro, Two or possibly Geo. The next two look like “him say” or “Lin say”. Was there a furniture maker called something Linsay?
21. On p. 133 section 55 the MS has a semi-colon after ‘convent’ instead of a full stop, and the h in the following word (‘He’) is not capitalized. There is also a comma after “pleased by” in the MS.
22. On p. 134 section 57 ‘things’ is ‘thing’ in the MS
23. On p. 135 section 63 there is no comma after ‘Something’ in the MS
24. On p. 136 section 70 the MS says “I can’t remember” rather than simply “can’t remember”
25. On p. 138 section 77 the word ‘could’ looks more like ‘would’ in the MS, and the word rendered as ‘take’ (which makes the most sense, given the context) looks more like ‘late’. I doubt this is a mistake, except on Anscombe’s part, but it does reflect the difficulty of reading her handwriting sometimes.
26. On p. 138 section 82 the MS has commas before and after “I remember”
27. On p. 140 section 89 the MS does not have the word ‘that’ before ‘Russell’
28. On p. 141 section 96 I think there should be a comma after ‘that’ (line 2)
29. On p. 142 section 96 I think there should be a comma after ‘badly’
30. On p. 142 section 99 the question mark after ‘strength’ has been supplied by the editors
31. On p. 145 section 106 the word given as ‘as’ looks like ‘in’ in the MS
32. On p. 151 section 130 the final sentence begins a new paragraph in the MS. In fact, each half of the equation starts on a new line
33. On p. 151 section 131 a comma has been added after ‘saying’
34. On p. 151 section 133 the MS has a comma after “But of course”
35. On p. 153 section 138 in the MS it looks as though the word ‘in’ appears after ‘smile’, there is no comma after “savagely serious”, a new paragraph begins with “The only one I can remember” and the words “at all” appear after this ‘remember’. They are absent from the printed text.
36. On p. 153 section 140 the MS appears to have a comma rather than a full stop after 1944 and then the next word (“he’d”) starts with a lower case h. Anscombe seems to write Moral Science Club, which has been corrected to Moral Sciences Club.
37. On p. 155 section 144 I think there should be a comma after ‘himself’ and a full stop, rather than a comma, after “Yes”.
38. On p. 157 section the MS has a comma after ‘came’
39. On p. 158 section 157 the published text is missing the word ‘quite’ after ‘remember’
40. On p. 158 section 161 the word ‘a’ has been added before ‘sculptor’ and it looks as though an ‘s’ has been omitted after ‘verb’
41. On p. 159 section 162 the word ‘that’ has been added between ‘thing’ and ‘Wittgenstein’
42. On p. 160 section 165 the MS says ‘used to’ but ‘would’ is printed in the book instead
43. On p. 161 section 170 the MS has a comma after “Oh”
44. On p. 165 section 183 in the MS it looks to me as though Anscombe has crossed out the ‘s’ at the end of ‘remarks’, which is printed as in the plural
45. On p. 167 section 189 I think the MS has a colon after ‘replied’
46. On p. 167 section 190 I think there should be a comma after ‘been’
47. On p. 168 section 192 the text says “and a lot of stuff in one long false note” whereas the MS appears to say “and a lot of stuff is one long false note”
48. On p. 169 section 195 the text has “And how would it look as if it looked as if the earth rotated on its axis?” while the MS says “And how would it look if it looked as if the earth rotated on its axis?”
49. On p. 170 section 198 the MS has a dash while the book has a semi-colon
50. On p. 171 section 200 a comma has been inserted after ‘time’
51. On p. 172 section 200 the words “we went’ have been omitted after “four o’clock” and the word ‘quarter’ has been used instead of Anscombe’s ¼
52. On p. 173 section 201 the MS seems to have “Now try and open your eyes!” rather than “Now try to open your eyes!”
53. On p. 174 section 202 in the MS there is a comma after ‘why’
54. On p. 175 section 205 a comma has been added after ‘roar’
55. On p. 176 section 207 the word ‘an’ has been omitted in “fear of an unforeseeable judgment”
56. On p. 176 section 208 the MS has a comma after ‘know’
57. On p. 176 section 209 the MS has a semi-colon, not a comma, after ‘time’ (I think) and a comma after ‘unaffected’
58. On p. 176 section 210 the word written as ‘train’ looks more like ‘tram’ to me
59. On p. 178 section 214 the word printed as ‘You’re’ looks in the MS as though it could be ‘Your’ (which would not be wrong—instead of saying “You are saying that you could not lie” Wittgenstein would be saying “About your having said that you could not lie…”
60. On p. 178 section 215 the book has ‘wouldn’t’ but I think the MS might say ‘couldn’t’
61. On p. 180 section 221 the word ‘I’ has been omitted between ‘which’ and ‘had’
62. On p. 184 section 228 I think there should be a comma after ‘listened’
63. On p. 186 section 234 I think instead of “him saying" it should be “his saying”

None of this matters very much, no doubt, but perhaps someone will care. More details (including a missing paragraph) in the review.

Contextual Ethics

 

This new collection is out now. Here's a description:

Moral philosophy has traditionally strived towards abstraction and universalization, its claims tending to leave behind the specificity of bodies, individuals’ lives, situations, culture, and history. Yet there are ways of thinking and doing moral philosophy that do not leave context behind but make it their. This makes it a point , never to lose sight of context, to place it at the centre of ethical investigations. To present and defend the richness and validity of this approach to ethics his is , at any rate, the claim and the ambition of this volume.

Placed in the new field of contextual ethics, the anthology presents articles that focus on issues ranging from the theoretical and the methodological – Does taking context into account imply relativism?  Can the normative and the descriptive in ethics be separated? How does moral change occur in the thick of everyday life? – to applied issues in biomedical, animal, and environmental ethics. The volume opens with a programmatic chapter on contextual ethics that traces its historical roots, its most central themes and methodological issues, and its relation to different traditions in contemporary ethics.

South Korean cafes

My wife has become interested in all things Korean, so we've traveled to South Korea each of the last two years. Perhaps the main thing that has struck me about the country is the cafes. They are great (good food, good design, good atmosphere, good coffee), but also interesting. They suggest something about the culture, and raise questions about how to live. Korean Air even has a playlist called "Pop Songs to Enjoy in Instagram-Worthy Cafes," and the popularity of Instagram in South Korea is surely part of the reason these places exist and look the way they do. The look tends to be minimalist: lots of white, lots of concrete. The menus tend to be either minimalist (one place in Jeonju had no food at all, another in Seoul had about two kinds of cookies and nothing else to eat) or the opposite (scones or bagels in flavors you wouldn't dream of). The music tends to be classic and mellow, e.g. Ella Fitzgerald and Frank Sinatra, but perhaps a bit less obvious than that. The implication seems to be that life should be simple but beautiful, or that a simple life can be enough if its contents are beautiful enough. A bit like the film Perfect Days (which is set in Tokyo, and, I think, is a bit ambiguous as to whether such a life is really enough), whose hero lives a simple life but listens only to classic rock and pop music, and reads classic literature. He doesn't have much in his life, but what he has is good. There's a thread on reddit about this film (here) in which a couple of posters say (plausibly) that the movie is Buddhist, emphasizing the value of living with less stuff. But how unattached to things are you (or can you be) if you enjoy the classics? (Not to mention really good coffee and baked treats.) Is this tastefully minimalist life compatible with love or family life? Is it really desirable, or is it a bit sad?

Some of these questions (the first, especially) come up in Hōjōki, whose Buddhist author (Kamo no Chōmei, c. 1154-1216) lives in seclusion in a ten foot square hut, but nevertheless brings with him musical instruments and books of poetry, and worries that he is too attached to his hut and too proud of the life he has been living. The thought of living with only a relatively small number of carefully curated possessions is appealing, but how easy would it be to achieve? How satisfying would it really be? And, even if satisfaction is not the right goal, would it be worthwhile? 

South Korean cafes offer a vision of a tastefully simple life, sophisticated yet in touch with nature (when possible, they have really nice views). Quite a few explicitly connect this with philosophy. Cafe Onion's baseball caps have a quote from Will Durant about Aristotle sewn on the inside, and the person behind several popular chains of cafes, Ryo, has recently published a book called Philosophy Ryo. Of course, there's philosophy and "philosophy," and when a businessperson publishes their philosophy it's reasonable to wonder whether this is sincere or just marketing. Or perhaps, as seems likely, some mix of the two. But then philosophy, or the idea of philosophy, is part of the brand. Some posters advertising Cafe Layered, part of Ryo's empire, feature a book by Sartre (in Portuguese) along with some British money, an apple, and a book that seems to be for bird watchers. Layered, which has writing, often in English, all over the walls and even windows, presents itself as being for people who enjoy simple things, like coffee and toast, without everything having to be perfect. But then it sells high quality coffee and cakes, especially scones, and I don't think toast is even an option. But perhaps it's important to some people to think of their fancy treats as not fancy at all. 

Anscombe on Faith and Justice

Another new publication. This one is short, open access, and quotes unpublished letters to von Wright. 

Abstract

In G. E. M. Anscombe’s extensive correspondence with G. H. von Wright, one of the many topics that come up is the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. What she says in these letters is significant because of the interest in what she wrote elsewhere about the use of atomic weapons. It is especially interesting because she might seem to imply here that only a person with religious faith is capable of being just. This paper quotes the relevant passages from the correspondence, explores what she might have meant, and concludes that she is not committed to the view that only the faithful can be just.

Wittgenstein Versus Anscombe on How to Live

My next book is now available to pre-order here. Here's a description of the contents:

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) and Elizabeth Anscombe (1919–2001) are two of the most interesting and influential philosophers of the twentieth century. Anscombe was Wittgenstein's friend and student, chosen by him to be his translator and editor, but the two had very different views on ethics and religion. Anscombe was a devout Catholic, while Wittgenstein was much less traditional. Each cared passionately about living the right way, and each was noted for their eccentricity. Why did they live as they did? What did they have to say about how one ought to live? And what, if anything, can we learn from them? This book explores their different beliefs about killing in war, about sexuality, about politics, about God, and about the meaning of life. Drawing on previously unpublished work by Anscombe, Duncan Richter explains where these beliefs came from, how they affected the lives of these two great philosophers, and some of the strengths and weaknesses of their divergent positions. If we understand these two thinkers better, we may improve our own chances of living a good life.

Sheer Poison? Anscombe and Wittgenstein on Philosophy of Religion

I have a new, open access publication available here. It's part of a special issue on New Work on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion edited by Sebastian Sunday Grève.

Abstract 

Anscombe once said to Anthony Kenny that “On the topic of religion, Wittgenstein is sheer poison”. This paper offers an assessment of that view. I take it that Anscombe meant that Wittgenstein was a bad influence rather than that his views were necessarily false, although she seems to have been uncertain about what exactly his views were. In “Paganism, Superstition and Philosophy”, she identifies five ideas that make up “a certain current in philosophy which has a strong historical connection with Wittgenstein”. I identify some of the sources of these ideas, in Wittgenstein’s writing and in work by some of his followers, and consider what Anscombe’s objections to them might have been. I also look at whether we should think of these ideas as belonging either to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion or to his personal beliefs. This will involve some consideration of how far we can, or should try to, separate the personal from the philosophical. So far as he held objectionable views about religion, I argue that these ought to be considered personal rather than philosophical.

Anti-Theory in Ethics and Philosophy of Science

 

This book brings together scholars from ethics and philosophy of science in order to identify ways in which insights gleaned from one subfield can shed light on the other. The book focuses on two radical Anti-Theory movements that emerged in the 1970’s and 1980’s, one in philosophy of science and the other in ethics. Both movements challenged attempts to supply general, systematized philosophical theories within their domains and thus invited the reconsideration of what philosophical theorizing can and should offer. Each of these movements was domain-specific – that is, each criticized the aspirations to philosophical theories within its own domain and advanced arguments aimed at philosophers within their own specific subfield. The innovative systematic comparative examination of these movements by scholars from each domain sheds new light on some familiar debates, offers new and exciting paths of research to pursue in each domain, provides insight into the place of science and ethics in contemporary life and culture, and enables a fresh view on the longstanding and alluring philosophical aspiration for a fully general, absolute theory of reality and an ultimate objective foundational theory of knowledge.

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-ix

   
   

2. Introduction to Philosophical Theorizing and Its Limits: Anti-theory in Ethics and Philosophy of Science

   • Uri D. Leibowitz, Klodian Coko, Isaac Nevo

   Pages 1-13

3. Moral Philosophy Is Not What It Used To Be: Reflections on Three Decades of Anti-theory

   • Nora Hämäläinen

   Pages 15-34

4. Feyerabend’s Asymmetry Argument for Epistemological Anarchism

   • Jamie Shaw

   Pages 35-51

5. The Scientific Method and the Moral Method

   • Uri D. Leibowitz

   Pages 53-80

6. Against Theory and Method in Ethics and Philosophy of Science

   • Klodian Coko

   Pages 81-104

7. Ethical Description as a Form of Anti-theory

   • Duncan Richter

   Pages 105-122

8. Overcoming Metaethics: Interpretation, Objectivity, and Realism

   • Michiel Meijer

   Pages 123-140

9. What Is It Like to See an Animal? Self-Examination and the Moral Relevance of Ordinary Descriptions of Animals

   • Erich Linder

   Pages 141-157

10. Anti-theory in Philosophy: A Case for Pragmatism

    • Isaac Nevo

    Pages 159-181

11. The Dangers of ‘Best Practices’: Against Supposedly Revolutionary Theories of Evidence in Medicine

    • Charles M. Djordjevic

    Pages 183-209

Available here and wherever expensive academic books are sold