"Pain" is "real" when you get other people to believe in it. If no one believes in it but you, your "pain" is "madness" or "hysteria.”The difficult thing is to see, or to keep in view, the fact that language is both contingent (dependent on social and historical factors) and necessary (it's the only game in town for thinking, understanding, and communicating). Trying to get the former truth in focus can lead to things like relativism and attempting to "get outside of language," while focusing on the latter can lead to what looks like naivete.
The other day my friend Jim talked about people in a village in Africa (I don't remember which country) who would unashamedly steal from outsiders but would frown on stealing from insiders. They would even beat mercilessly any outsider caught stealing from them. This put Jim in an interesting position, because he lived there as an outsider, and regularly had things stolen from him, but lived there long enough to gain insider status. So, he asked, was it wrong for them to steal from him when he first got there? Yes, said my friend John Paul. Jim's reply was that of course John Paul would think that, because he's a product of a culture where we think stealing is (pretty much) always wrong, just as the villagers are products of a culture that takes a different view.
I think Jim has a point, but it was almost as if, in his view, everyone is just a product of their culture except him. And that's not true. We can travel to other places, read about them in books, learn about them from conversations with people like Jim. And we can question our values as a result. We can see that it is contingent that we have the values we happen to have. But unless we give them up (either completely or by suspending or bracketing them) then they are still our values. And the 'we' implied by "our" here includes Jim. Part of thinking something is wrong is not doing it, and he doesn't steal. Whether we should judge or condemn people from other cultures is another matter, but if we don't do so then this suggests that we don't believe as strongly as we might in the particular values that we don't apply to others, or else that we don't regard those others as "we" in some sense. Neither of which is necessarily good or necessarily bad. (Some values probably should be adhered to more strongly than others, and a refusal to judge could be either wisely liberal or foolishly condescending.)
The same kind of thing goes for belief in human rights. Yes, not everyone believes in them. Yes, they have only been talked about in relatively recent times. Yes, creativity and imagination (including explicit reference to metaphor) were involved in their 'discovery'. In that sense we made them up. But it doesn't follow that people don't really have rights. Saying that is making a value judgment, not merely drawing a logical conclusion from established facts. One can no more step outside values than one can step outside of language. We can be amoral, but that means adopting a specific position on the ethics axis (the one marked by a zero). We can't just step off the axis altogether.
Another example of the kind of thing I have in mind occurs in this interview with Lee Braver. Braver says:
When we want to answer a question about the world, when we want to settle an argument, all we have to go on is what we can come up with. Appealing to an absolutely independent and authoritative reality to rule on our disagreements doesn’t work because, as Sartre argued, it’s still us making the appeal and figuring out how to understand whatever answer we get back. Invoking an absolutely separate reality that “knows” the answer regardless of what we come up with is, as Wittgenstein says, just a picture. It doesn’t, and ex hypothesi can’t, affect our practices of settling disputes or discovering knowledge. It’s just us down here, without a Great Umpire in the Sky, endlessly squabbling.This seems to me to lean too far in the anti-realist, almost relativist direction. What he means might be right, but look at what he says: "all we have to go on is what we can come up with." As opposed to ... what? "Appealing to an absolutely independent and authoritative reality to rule on our disagreements doesn’t work." Right, because only a judge can rule, and "appealing to reality" makes no sense. It can't talk back. But if Braver means that we cannot judge according to the facts, then of course he's wrong. The facts can speak for themselves, and do in some cases. It might sound as though I'm just contradicting myself here, but what I mean is something like the very simple facts that "appealing to reality" has no meaning in our language while "the facts speak for themselves" does. More Braver: "Invoking an absolutely separate reality that “knows” the answer regardless of what we come up with is, as Wittgenstein says, just a picture." I don't know where Wittgenstein says this (or is it just that Wittgenstein talks about pictures in this kind of way?), but who invokes an absolutely separate reality that "knows" the answer? Unless Braver means religious believers then I can't think of anyone who does this, or would think to do so. And neither Wittgenstein nor I think that belief in God is "just a picture."
So are men and women really equal, with a right to equal opportunity, or do we just thinkof them that way? Both (except that the words "really" and "just" are misleading). If we do "just" think of them this way then we do think (and should say) that they are ("really") this way. Is Beethoven really a great composer or is it all just a matter of taste? Both: taste is what allows us to recognize such greatness, but anyone who does recognize it will not say that it is "just" a matter of taste. (There is something like Descartes's response to the accusation that he argues in a circle here. While you have the proofs of God's existence in mind, he thinks, you cannot doubt them. That's debatable, of course, but while you are looking at the sunset, if you are really looking, you cannot doubt its beauty. And closing your eyes in order to judge whether it is really beautiful or not is not being more objective. It's an act that embodies an evaluative stance. It means choosing to adopt a different perspective. But it's still a perspective.) Are you really in pain, or is it just that we call people in your condition "in pain"? Both. We really do call that pain, and here I am calling it pain: It really is pain. Yes, I am saying that, but I'm not just saying it (in the sense that I don't really mean it). Failure to see that would be making the mistake of anti-realism. The opposite mistake is thinking that the word "really" does any work in the sentence "It really is pain." That's the mistake of realism.
Just a small thought on one aspect of what Braver says: appealing to something like the existence of an objective standard (or truth, etc.) at least has the function of grounding a reason to have a fallibilist attitude that doesn't simply collapse into relativism. (So that would make it more than just a picture, i.e. the picture has a point.) At the same time, I agree with your point about "really."
ReplyDeleteYes. We do appeal to objective standards for pretty much just this reason. What Braver denies is that there is an "absolutely independent and authoritative" standard to appeal to. If he means the kind of standards we appeal to all the time then what he says is obviously false (it seems to me). If he means something else, as apparently he does and must, then he seems to be titling at windmills.
ReplyDeleteIt appears that Jim (explicitly or implicitly) made a prospective cost-benefit trade - possibly including the assumption that in time he might be treated as if he were a member of the community - and concluded that the trade favored staying in the village despite the thefts. Viewed in that light, there seems to have been no necessity to judge the village's standards - Jim could either accept their consequences or leave. Whether it was "wrong for them to steal from him when he first got there" doesn't seem a well-formed question. From whose POV? Certainly not that of the villagers. From Jim's, the answer appears to depend on whether he's a cultural relativist. If he is and he assumes the intent is for the answer to be from his POV, he'll perhaps demur, seeing nothing that follows from any answer; if not, he may well answer "yes". But what follows from that?
ReplyDeleteIt appears that in time Jim was indeed treated as if he were a member of the community so that the thefts ceased and the standards became irrelevant to him in practice. He, of course, would not have followed them vis-a-vis other outsiders since he retained his own standards (ie, those of his native community). And this highlights a problem I have with critics of cultural relativism who seem to assume that implicit in that posture is intellectual - perhaps even behavioral - acquiescence to every culture's standards. But as DR suggests, we (mostly) retain our standards as we move among communities, unless a move amounts to abandoning one community and joining another with different standards which we adopt. Accepting the contingency of standards doesn't mean having none, just limiting the obligation to adhere to them to member's of one's own community.
if we don't [judge or condemn people from other cultures] then this suggests that we don't believe as strongly as we might in the particular values that we don't apply to others, or else that we don't regard those others as "we" in some sense.
Those not in our community aren't "we" by definition. One may despise the standards of other communities (or even those of subgroups of our own larger community - see almost any politically oriented blog or presidential candidates debate) and as a natural emotional response may judge or condemn the adherents. But in moments of calm reflection, as a determinist I can't justify such a posture. Nevertheless, even a determinist may try - non-judgmentally - to effect change in a community's standards. One person's determined actions can be among the determinants of other people's future behavior.
I don't care for the wording of Braver's quote, but I subscribe to what I take to be his intended meaning, viz, that even divine revelation is usually mediated by all-too-human interpreters, and even if unmediated has to be interpreted by fallible recipients. For better or worse - of late, arguably worse - "we have met the [standard giver] and it is us" - the members of our community.
PS - in case you didn't get enough coding theory in my comment of a few weeks ago, there's more here (I envision LW turning over in his grave):
http://philosophicalinstigations.blogspot.com/2011/11/remarks-48-49.html
Whether it was "wrong for them to steal from him when he first got there" doesn't seem a well-formed question. From whose POV?
ReplyDeleteThis is the kind of thing Jim was suggesting, I think. Or at least almost suggesting. But it's relativism, isn't it? There is no wrong, only wrong-from-this-or-that-POV. And I think that saying this is accepting the stealing. Of course one might well accept it, but doing so isn't being neutral: it's siding with the villagers in this instance.
Accepting the contingency of standards doesn't mean having none, just limiting the obligation to adhere to them to member's of one's own community.
I think we can accept the contingency of standards and still apply them to others. If I had been born in another place and time I might have all kinds of evil beliefs. It doesn't follow that such beliefs are not evil. Or is that missing the point? Beliefs have to belong to something somewhat similar to our own form of life in order to be classifiable as evil, after all. I wouldn't necessarily call an alien species evil if it enslaved or ate human beings, for instance. And perhaps some human cultures are different enough for the same thing to apply.
Those not in our community aren't "we" by definition.
Well, they aren't we-community-members, but they could be we-human-beings. They might not be members of our ethnic community, say, but still be members of our moral community.
One may despise the standards of other communities (or even those of subgroups of our own larger community - see almost any politically oriented blog or presidential candidates debate) and as a natural emotional response may judge or condemn the adherents. But in moments of calm reflection, as a determinist I can't justify such a posture.
It's hard, if not impossible, to justify any moral posture completely. But I don't think that's a reason not to adopt such a posture. Nor does it really seem possible to get over morality. In another world I could have grown up a Nazi, and kids raised with Nazi values would surely have a hard time escaping them. In that sense it might not be someone's fault that they are a Nazi. But Nazis are still very badly wrong, and I think it's important a) to resist Nazism (and racism, homophobia, sexism, certain forms of violent and intolerant religion, etc.), and b) to see that tolerating such ideologies and the behavior they inform is not innocently or admirably objective but is itself the enactment of a value judgment. The sphere that is none of anybody else's business, if there is such a thing at all, does not draw itself.
I don't care for the wording of Braver's quote, but I subscribe to what I take to be his intended meaning
Me too, I think. I like Braver's work and suspect he might have spoken imperfectly in the context of a rather informal interview. But it's hard to be sure what he meant.
Thanks for the link. I'll be sure to check it out.
DR (your preferred salutation?) -
ReplyDeleteI'm having a very hard time constructing a response, possibly because we seem to be mixing several issues that need to be separated - which I'll try to do. Also, I'm finding "wrong" problematic because ambiguous and have tried to disambiguate by using "mistaken" (eg, having arguably flawed supporting arguments) and "immoral" instead.
One is the narrow issue of what Jim should have done when first confronted by the standards in the village. As indicated in my previous comment, I view him as having been faced with an unavoidable cost-benefit trade. If he stayed he would have to "accept" the likely consequence that some of his things would be stolen, at least for some period of time. But he would not have to "accept" the village standards by either endorsing or adopting them. He obviously would object to the stealing and would not violate his own standards by stealing from other outsiders. Therefore, I wouldn't describe him as either being "neutral" or "taking the villagers' side", but instead would just assume that his cost-benefit trade dictated that he stay.
Another issue is Jim's comment about John Paul's declaring the villagers "wrong" (I assume in the sense of immoral) in stealing from Jim. I might criticize Jim's comment (as quoted - "of course John Paul would think that") for being rather dismissive - John Paul might very well have shared my much more enlightened view. (:>) And I consider the question pointless to begin with - why does the answer matter? But I don't find fault with what I take to be Jim's seemingly straightforward point, viz, the natural response from someone from our culture is "yes". You apparently read much more into his comment, but so far I don't quite see why.
When offending "standards" are today widely opposed (eg, fascism, genocide, slavery), one can even go beyond calling them "immoral" and move up to "evil". Even those who acknowledge no absolute authority for such determinations may raise no objection despite recognizing that judgment as based on nothing more than consensus. But the more interesting cases are where the situation is less clear cut - eg, abortion or capital punishment. Each side obviously sees the other as mistaken, but now there isn't even consensus to justify describing the opposition as immoral. One may describe declining to do so as "relativism", but the obvious response is: to one who doesn't acknowledge any absolute authority, what other position would you suggest?
It's hard, if not impossible, to justify any moral posture completely. But I don't think that's a reason not to adopt such a posture.
On rereading, I see that the structure of the paragraph to which you are responding was ambiguous. The posture I can't justify is judging and condemning adherents, even of positions I despise (although I nevertheless often do - mea culpa). I of course try to justify my position on any issue.
Not to inject politics into the discussion, but I couldn't help but think of our exchange as I was reading this. And sure enough, in an update the author addresses moral relativism - altho I would describe neither what his opponents accuse him of doing nor, notwithstanding Orwell's quote, what they are doing as "moral relativism". (FWIW, wiki seems to agree with me on that.)
ReplyDeleteThanks, Charles. You can call me DR or Duncan, I don't mind either way. My posts are tagged DR, but no one calls me that in real life.
ReplyDeleteIf he stayed he would have to "accept" the likely consequence that some of his things would be stolen, at least for some period of time. But he would not have to "accept" the village standards by either endorsing or adopting them.
I agree. Although staying in those circumstances does show a degree of tolerance or acceptance. It shows that one does not regard it as so intolerable that one has to leave, for instance, as you might if they were killing people rather than stealing a few things.
I don't find fault with what I take to be Jim's seemingly straightforward point, viz, the natural response from someone from our culture is "yes". You apparently read much more into his comment, but so far I don't quite see why.
You're right that Jim's point is seemingly straightforward and correct. What I have an issue with is not so much what he said as what he nearly said, or what he almost seemed to be implying. (And I fully realize how unfair that s to Jim. Maybe I should direct my criticism at Jim' or some other fictional person.) What I object to, or would if anyone had said it, is the idea that ordinary mortals naively swallow and parrot the values of their culture, while the enlightened few are able to transcend their own culture's values and see that each culture's claims are equal. Of course different cultures have different values. Seeing that does not mean judging them all to be equal. One can only do that if one gives up all values. That probably isn't possible, but if it is, it isn't enlightened.
Each side obviously sees the other as mistaken, but now there isn't even consensus to justify describing the opposition as immoral. One may describe declining to do so as "relativism", but the obvious response is: to one who doesn't acknowledge any absolute authority, what other position would you suggest?
I wouldn't call that relativism necessarily. You can regard someone's position as morally wrong without regarding them as an immoral person. But if they have a mistaken belief about what is moral, don't they have an immoral belief? That is, how can I disagree morally with a pro-life or pro-choice person without thinking that their moral belief is wrong (in a moral sense)? If we disagree about the justice of some situation or course of action, I think your view is unjust. Isn't that right?
I would describe neither what his opponents accuse him of doing nor, notwithstanding Orwell's quote, what they are doing as "moral relativism".
ReplyDeleteMe neither. Criticizing nationalism, or hypocrisy, or the United States is not relativism. Nor is criticizing Iran. People aren't so much relativists, generally, as they are tribalists. It might be better if they were openly so, instead of hiding behind appeals to various principles. But maybe such appeals indicate a recognition than mere tribalism is shameful. And that might be a good thing.
Duncan -
ReplyDeleteOf course different cultures have different values. Seeing that does not mean judging them all to be equal.
To me, relativism means recognizing no absolute authority for resolving differences of opinion on a particular topic. So, recognizing no absolute moral authority I can't justify the unequivocal assertion "X is immoral". But that doesn't preclude weighing X vs Y and judging one preferable to the other - ie, unequal - according to some criteria.
Applying that to the villagers, perhaps their policy on theft reflected a need to discourage immigration due to limited resources. I might question their method of doing so, but am I to declare it "immoral" just because an electrified border fence wasn't an available option?
If we disagree about the justice of some situation or course of action, I think your view is unjust. Isn't that right?
A good illustrative example. There are all kinds of arguments for a steeply graduated income tax and a near-confiscatory "death tax". But I cringe every time I hear calls for a more "just" tax policy because I see that as empty rhetoric. The other side thinks higher taxes are "unjust", and I know of no authority to which to appeal for resolution. Arguing issues like abortion or capital punishment in terms of "moral" vs "immoral" seems equally futile.
As you see, my position is essentially pragmatic. Despite feeling strongly about many issues, I see no practical value in using "values" rhetoric - except perhaps for marketing purposes, and I consider most marketing immoral! ~(:>)
And I agree that residual tribalism explains much of our behavior.
I think I agree with you on the value of values rhetoric. It doesn't help much. And certainly calls for a more "just" tax policy don't do much (except perhaps make unjust proposals sound better than they might without a moral disguise). But it doesn't follow that no tax policies are unjust. Taxing the poor to provide for the rich would be (is?) unjust, for instance. At least it seems to make perfectly good sense to think so, even if we can't prove it and/or there is no practical value in saying it out loud.
ReplyDeleteAnd I don't know how to argue about abortion or capital punishment except in moral terms. Of course, if one side just says "It's immoral" and the other replies "No it's not" then the debate is hopeless. But if we leave out all reference to justice then we leave out what is at issue. Unless the debate is limited for practical purposes to non-moral issues, such as what will do most to reduce the number of murders committed, or what will be cheapest. But insisting on this kind of limit on what we should talk or think about seems kind of immoral in itself.
To me, relativism means recognizing no absolute authority for resolving differences of opinion on a particular topic. So, recognizing no absolute moral authority I can't justify the unequivocal assertion "X is immoral".
Differences get resolved by force or by time, I suppose, or not at all. But I think you might mean an authority in the sense of some judge or standard that determines, independent of us, what is right or wrong. This would be something like God, but a God unaffected by the Euthyphro dilemma. If not believing in such a God is relativism then I'm a relativist. But I think of relativism as the idea that all moral views, or at least some incompatible ones, are true. And I don't believe that. It may be that I cannot prove I am right. It may be that there is nothing beyond people that could ever say that something was wrong or right, good or evil. But my view is, of course, still my view, and as long as I regard something as wrong I will think and say that it is wrong.
Well, I think this exchange has helped me clarify my own position. Going back to the Jim scenario, suppose his question is rephrased as: "What do you think about the villagers' stealing from me and why?" If someone answers "I think it was wrong [or even immoral] and here's why. Blah, blah, blah.", I have no objection - all I really care about are the reasons for disapproving. My problem is if the only reason given is "it's immoral" since that's pretty much a conversation stopper - I don't know how to respond. But if someone offers other reasons for opposing a position, adding "and I think it's immoral", that isn't a problem since I can just respond to the other reasons.
ReplyDeleteDid we succeed in beating this issue to death?
I don't think it's dead yet, since I still suspect I might have said at least one wrong thing somewhere along the line. But I'll have to leave that till I figure out what, if anything, it is.
ReplyDeleteYes, "it's just immoral" is a conversation stopper, at least in some situations. Other times it might start a conversation, e.g. if the person you say it to hadn't even considered that there was a moral issue at stake. Sometimes people seem to forget about ethics completely.
This is great fun for me, so if you're able to effect a resurrection either here or in a follow-up post, I'll be there.
ReplyDeleteGlad to hear it. It's fun for me too.
ReplyDelete