It seems to me that perceptions of the truth about philosophy (as a profession, as a discipline, and as a body of wisdom or knowledge) are likely to be distorted. For instance, if someone starts a thread of comments on what philosophers are teaching next semester, then people who feel good about what they are teaching are more likely to respond quickly than those who feel bad about it. So the people who aren't teaching because they don't have jobs and the people who are teaching numerous large sections of uninteresting (-sounding) courses might well be drowned out by people teaching small numbers of boutique courses on niche topics.
Papers that argue for unfashionable views are less likely to be published than others. On the other hand, merely being right is not enough for a paper to be published. It must be (perceived as) interesting, which means, roughly, within the limits of the fashionable but otherwise as eccentric as possible. (Although admittedly sometimes "interesting" means "exactly what I think too.")
Everyone agrees that philosophy should be written as clearly as possible but no clearer. People one agrees with are much clearer than others. I agree, for instance, that Daniel Dennett writes with a certain clarity, but I remember feeling that Brainstorms was unreadable because I had too many reservations about and disagreements with things he wrote to keep them all in the air at the same time. Now, I might have been quite wrong to have these reservations, but if I wasn't then Dennett's writing is only superficially clear; in reality it (in the hypothetical case that I was right) is a mass of murkiness and, possibly, confusion. Whether he is really clear or only superficially, misleadingly so depends in large part on how right he is. The same kind of thing, except in reverse, could be said about the famous obscurity of Heidegger. He believed that he had to write that way, and knew it wasn't easy reading. If he was wrong then this is a failing, of course, but if he was right then he is as clear as he could be. (I don't mean to suggest that he was necessarily either all right or all wrong, of course.) It's interesting to see some people in Brian Leiter's thread objecting to unnecessary, excessive clarity (here is what I will say, here it is, here is what I have argued, and so on). I sympathize, but achieving just the right amount of clarity and explanation depends on having readers who agree with you just enough to need telling only what you tell them, to need spelling out only what you spell out. The right amount of clarity isn't something one can just have independent of one's audience. Sociology (or fashion) comes in here, too, as knowing the audience is almost impossible if you went to the wrong schools, read the wrong books, talk to the wrong people (or hardly anyone at all), etc.
Now this might all sound like a complaint, but I don't think I have suffered because of any of these things. They do seem worth being aware of though.