78. Compare knowing and saying:how many feet high Mont Blanc is—
This refers back to 75-77, so we should have in mind knowing what goodness is, how it appears, but not being able to say what it is. "Good" is like "game," according to Wittgenstein. We know how the word "game" ("good") is used in the sense that we can use it, understand others who use it (usually), and can give examples. But we can't say how it is used in any precise, definite way. We cannot give a definition, an essence, because there isn't one.how the word "game" is used—how a clarinet sounds.If you are surprised that one can know something and not be able to say it, you are perhaps thinking of a case like the first. Certainly not of one like the third.
(I want to say here that anyone who offers a definition, a theory of goodness or an account in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions or a formula or anything like that, is doing something different, playing a different game, from what I do. In some ways it is alike, but in others different. Is the difference essential? I say it is. He might insist otherwise. He might even claim that he has captured the essence of what I do. But the answer depends not on some independent fact but on what I say/know/accept about what I am doing. Is that right?)