Ethics in the Philosophical Investigations

75. What does it mean to know what a game is? What does it mean, to know it and not be able to say it? Is this knowledge somehow equivalent to an unformulated definition? So that if it were formulated I should be able to recognize it as the expression of my knowledge? Isn't my knowledge, my concept of a game, completely expressed in the explanations that I could give? That is, in my describing examples of various kinds of game; shewing how all sorts of other games can be constructed on the analogy of these; saying that I should scarcely include this or this among games; and so on.

76. If someone were to draw a sharp boundary I could not acknowledge it as the one that I too always wanted to draw, or had drawn in my mind. For I did not want to draw one at all. His concept can then be said to be not the same as mine, but akin to it. The kinship is that of two pictures, one of which consists of colour patches with vague contours, and the other of patches similarly shaped and distributed, but with clear contours. The kinship is just as undeniable as the difference.

77. And if we carry this comparison still further it is clear that the degree to which the sharp picture can resemble the blurred one depends on the latter's degree of vagueness. For imagine having to sketch a sharply defined picture 'corresponding' to a blurred one. In the latter there is a blurred red rectangle: for it you put down a sharply defined one. Of course—several such sharply defined rectangles can be drawn to correspond to the indefinite one.—But if the colours in the original merge without a hint of any outline won't it become a hopeless task to draw a sharp picture corresponding to the blurred one? Won't you then have to say: "Here I might just as well draw a circle or heart as a rectangle, for all the colours merge. Anything—and nothing—is right."——And this is the position you are in if you look for definitions corresponding to our concepts in aesthetics or ethics.

In such a difficulty always ask yourself: How did we learn the meaning of this word ("good" for instance)? From what sort of examples? In what language-games? Then it will be easier for you to see that the word must have a family of meanings.

There's a lot here.

For one thing, I think the mention of ethics late in 77 comes as something of a shock, sending you back at least to the beginning of 75 to see what Wittgenstein is talking about. A dialogue seems implicit here, and I wonder what would happen, what might come out, if it were made explicit.

A. What does it mean to know what a game is?

B. Well, for one thing, it means being able to say what a game is, being able to answer the question, "What is a game?"

A. What does it mean, to know it and not be able to say it?

B. Huh? Oh. Well, to be able to identify various games as games, and not to mistakenly call things games that aren't games. Something like that, perhaps.

A. Is this knowledge somehow equivalent to an unformulated definition?

B. It's like it. If someone has knowledge like this then we might use it to draw out a definition from them. We could ask her what the cases all have in common, what would disqualify something from counting, and so on. She might be able to tell us what conditions are necessary and what sufficient for something to count as whatever it is we were talking about. A person who can identify games correctly is like someone who can identify, say, cars correctly, and who does so on the basis of an unformulated definition, or at least has implicit in her know-how a knowledge that such-and-such is the correct definition of a car.

A.  So that if it were formulated I should be able to recognize it as the expression of my knowledge?

B. But in the case we're talking about we have the ability to identify without the ability to formulate a definition. It isn't contingently unformulated in this case. It cannot be formulated. Which I suppose means there is no it there at all. There is only the ability to identify individual cases.

A. Isn't my knowledge, my concept of a game, completely expressed in the explanations that I could give? That is, in my describing examples of various kinds of game; shewing how all sorts of other games can be constructed on the analogy of these; saying that I should scarcely include this or this among games; and so on.

B. That sounds right. There is nothing else to be expressed. Although, of course, the explanations that I could give are not all the explanations that I do give.

A. If someone were to draw a sharp boundary I could not acknowledge it as the one that I too always wanted to draw, or had drawn in my mind. For I did not want to draw one at all.

B. Well, if you did not want to draw one at all then of course a drawn one would not be the same as the one that you did not draw! You don't have a boundary in mind. You only have the examples that you produce or could produce, the ability to tell game from non-game but no recipe or formula for telling one from the other.

A. His concept can then be said to be not the same as mine, but akin to it. The kinship is that of two pictures, one of which consists of colour patches with vague contours, and the other of patches similarly shaped and distributed, but with clear contours. The kinship is just as undeniable as the difference.

B. Yes, O Socrates. Right. We call the same things games and the same things not games, but he has clear lines drawn between the two (is that the idea?) where I have none.

A. And if we carry this comparison still further it is clear that the degree to which the sharp picture can resemble the blurred one depends on the latter's degree of vagueness.

B. I see. So he doesn't have boundary lines as such, just sharp edges to the color patches. And I have blurry edges. And the blurrier they are, the less the two pictures can be alike. (By the way, this is reminding me of a couple of things. One is the opening section of the Investigations, where the shopkeeper follows precise, formula-type rules and the narrator--is that you?--says vaguely that it is in this and similar ways that we operate with language. The other is this passage from Wittgenstein:

In certain periods houses and chests of drawers are bounded with a cornice. Calling attention to boundedness is something desirable. We finish off posts of all kinds with knobs even where this is not demanded by functional considerations. A post must not simply stop. At other times there is a need not to emphasize, but rather artificially to conceal boundedness. An object must fade into its surroundings. In this style the edge of a tablecloth was given lace borders, which were originally nothing more than scallops cut into the cloth, for we did not want it to be sharply bounded. But at other times we give a border its own colour in order to call attention to it.

Is there a connection between this and what you are saying now?)

A. For imagine having to sketch a sharply defined picture 'corresponding' to a blurred one. In the latter there is a blurred red rectangle: for it you put down a sharply defined one. Of course—several such sharply defined rectangles can be drawn to correspond to the indefinite one.—But if the colours in the original merge without a hint of any outline won't it become a hopeless task to draw a sharp picture corresponding to the blurred one?

B. OK, you're ignoring my parenthetical thoughts? Fair enough. No sharp-edged picture will correspond perfectly to a blurry one, and the blurrier it is, the less the correspondence will be. Agreed.

A. Won't you then have to say: "Here I might just as well draw a circle or heart as a rectangle, for all the colours merge. Anything—and nothing—is right."

B. Well that's going a bit far, isn't it? But if there really is no hint of any outline, as you say, then no sharp-edged picture will correspond to it at all in terms of how the outlines match up. The colors might or might not be the same, but if we compare no edge with edge, then, well, there's no comparison.

A. And this is the position you are in if you look for definitions corresponding to our concepts in aesthetics or ethics.

B. Wait---what? Definitions in ethics and aesthetics are hopeless, completely hopeless, none better or worse than any other, because what we aim to define is completely indefinite? Why should I believe that?

A. In such a difficulty always ask yourself: How did we learn the meaning of this word ("good" for instance)?

B. I don't remember. From my parents and other grown-ups, I suppose.

A. From what sort of examples?

B. I don't know. From being called a good boy sometimes. From being asked "Is that good?" when eating. That kind of thing.  

A. In what language-games?

B. Different ones. Doing something I was asked or told to do would be called "good." Doing something that's healthy would be too. Food that tastes nice is "good." Food that is healthy is "good." Clothes that fit are "good." Obedience is usually "good." Pleasure is usually "good." Convenience is usually "good." I could go on.

A.  Then it will be easier for you to see that the word must have a family of meanings.

B. You mean meanings that are different but related, alike? Like games themselves. So I know what is good but not what good is? That is, I can identify which things are good and which are not, but not because I follow some rule-type formula or recipe? And if anyone comes up with a formula that obtains the same results then he is not doing what I do? The colors might be the same but the outlines are different, as it were. And in fact he won't obtain the same results because what I mean by "good" is completely indefinite. It is not contingent or accidental but necessary, essential to what I do when I call things "good" in aesthetics and ethics that I do not apply any kind of formula. Even if there is a complete overlap between all the music that I call good and all music that is very loud, I still do not mean "very loud" when I say "good." I am expressing approval, but not saying "I approve" (or anything else about myself). The person who applies a formula is doing something else. This is why there is no unformulated definition to try to tease out or discover.