Friday, June 14, 2019

The fallacy of the course again

I once talked about what I dubbed the fallacy of the course, which I'll just summarize here instead of trying to link to wherever I did that. The idea is simply that some significant problem can be solved by having students take a (single) course on something. I think this is a really bad idea, but it seems to be widespread and persistent. 

In Inside Higher Ed, John Warner complains (reasonably enough) about the effects of introductory college courses on economics. He recalls his own experience in such a course, and reports that:
Like the millions of other Americans who have taken Econ 101, I remember few of the specifics of macroeconomic theory I was supposed to learn in the class. Supply/demand, competition, market, blah blah blah. I engaged in the age-old tactics of passing a required gen ed class by cramming enough stuff into the temporary storage bin just long enough to take the exam, after which that briefly held knowledge leached from my brain, leaving only the thinnest residue behind. 
In the end, the chief byproduct of my general education exposure was a kind of indoctrination into the centrality of markets to understanding human behavior and the apparent importance of economics professors. 
This strikes me as a pretty good description of what happens to many/most students who take just one course in a subject. But then near the end of his article he asks rhetorically:
What if instead of Econ 101, we’d all taken the media literacy in politics course which would’ve allowed more people to more forcefully challenge the narrative that drove that debate?  
I think we know the answer. Instead of allowing (enabling?) more people to forcefully challenge the narrative, we would find that only the thinnest residue was left behind. This would be likely to be a kind of indoctrination, deliberate or otherwise, into feeling that bias and manipulation are everywhere, that no source of information can really be trusted, and that the truth, if there is such a thing, is effectively unknowable. (I worry that introductory ethics courses can exacerbate skepticism in a similar way.)

And in the comments, someone suggests that a course on ethics should be required before students take introductory economics. Sigh.

Sometimes I think the British system (roughly: study one thing a lot instead of lots of things a little) is better than the US approach. Although really the thing to do is probably just recognize that a single course on its own is often likely to be useless or even positively harmful, and design the curriculum accordingly.

6 comments:

  1. At least we can be pretty sure that students will never be required to take a course on Wittgenstein.

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    1. Ha! Although a course that students could tell they did not understand at all might be beneficial.

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  2. I've just written a post on 5 types of understanding which makes on exactly the same point but from a different perspective. (See http://metaphorhacker.net/2019/06/5-kinds-of-understanding-and-metaphors-missing-pieces-in-pedagogical-taxonomies).

    We think of understanding as one kind of thing but the sort of understanding a isolated intro course can engender is practically useless. I often recommend people should take intro courses at the end of their studies - they're better at summarizing than explaining.

    I often give the example of the Monty Python Philosopher's song as about the extent of understanding an intro course to philosophy can give you. A vague sense a bunch of words go together.

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  3. Very interesting.This thread from John Holbo on Nietzsche against generalism is also relevant.

    I like some superficial knowledge/understanding though, and want students to have it. That is, I think there are some concepts and tools that are easily learned (from, e.g., economics, psychology, and philosophy) that are useful. The arguments for and against increasing (or having) the minimum wage, for instance, are fairly simple and politically relevant. Knowing them could help people understand politics better, could help people talk to each other (in a way they couldn't so easily if everyone only had narrow specialist knowledge), and could help them understand why it's important for society to support these different disciplines. But we, at least in the US, really don't seem to have much of an idea about what concepts and tools we want to share. There is an ongoing debate about what general education requirements in universities and colleges should be, with no standard answer as far as I know. And people who teach introductory courses treat them, for obvious reasons, as introductions to their subject, rather than as courses designed to be as useful as possible to people who do not take any other courses in that subject. I don't even know what that would be in the case of philosophy, but perhaps you would start with a newspaper and go through pointing out potentially useful philosophical concepts, distinctions, and background from the history of ideas. You would have to do more than this, of course, if you wanted students to remember what you were teaching them, and learn to apply it themselves. But it could be a starting point. (Or perhaps the students themselves should be the starting point.)

    Perhaps the underlying problem is the cafeteria approach to education and the impossibility of central planning that goes with this. Students' choices shouldn't drive the curriculum any more than choices by patients (rather than doctors) should determine medical care. But I'm getting away from my original point and well into things I haven't really thought about.

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  4. I tried to differentiate between 3 kinds of superficial understanding. I would say that what you're after is what I called 'inferential' - this can be very useful and does not require deep expertise.

    But the question is how is such understanding acquired and how it is used. Here, I would argue that the notion of 'understanding' is not even all that relevant. I think this is a problem and constant tension of the 'evidence-based' practice which is often expressed as 'education-based' practice. But I would argue that here we are in the realm of ethics rather than pure epistemology. Not coincidentally, did I write a post (and a paper) called 'Epistemology as Ethics': http://metaphorhacker.net/2011/03/epistemology-as-ethics-decisions-and-judgments-not-methods-and-solutions-for-evidence-based-practice.

    I would also caution against the notion of 'students should know about' - from which 'there should be a course' is but a small step. I would want to defend their freedom not to know. Perhaps here, the very essence of Freire's pedagogy should be of relevance.

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    1. Thanks for the link.

      And yes, I am dangerously close to doing exactly what I criticize in others.

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