tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post5622824065429894048..comments2024-02-20T12:26:24.682-05:00Comments on language goes on holiday: Wittgenstein on clarityDuncan Richterhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-78221842604305075542012-05-29T09:48:12.873-04:002012-05-29T09:48:12.873-04:00Thanks, Brad. Your "first guess" sounds ...Thanks, Brad. Your "first guess" sounds at least about right to me. I'd like to read your essay--I hope it gets published.Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-29589952636447426192012-05-29T09:13:40.863-04:002012-05-29T09:13:40.863-04:00Duncan,
It's my own view that the other reaso...Duncan,<br /><br />It's my own view that the other reasons for thinking that a proposition/ostensive definition like "This is lilac" can't be an elucidation can be dealt with. I think, for example, that Anscombe's famous objection fails (this is the topic of an essay that I have under review). Also, while Wittgenstein doesn't give any examples, this (it seems to me) has more to do with the fact that he had not settled on what exactly an elementary color is, and not because he did not think that some colors are elementary.<br /><br />Concerning 6.54, I think that a different sort of elucidation is in question (as you suggest). Conant has some interesting comments on this in a footnote to <i>The Method of the Tractatus</i>:<br /><br />It is only this species of elucidation that Frege thinks compels us to traffic in nonsense. Within the broader genus of elucidation, elucidations will generally take the form of perfectly meaningful propositions (such as, e.g., elucidations of geometrically primitive terms). It is worth noting, however, that a parallel distinction between a generic and a specific notion of elucidation must also be drawn if one seeks to understand the different occurrences of the term <i>Erläuterung</i> in the <i>Tractatus</i>. In 3.263 what is at issue is a species of the genus pertaining to the elucidation of primitive signs (which I will not explore further here, other than to remark that perfectly meaningful propositions can serve as elucidations of this sort), whereas an understanding of 6.54 is unattainable apart from an understanding of what is peculiar to that species of the genus that aims to elucidate "philosophic matters" (and which proceeds through the employment of Sätze that the reader is to recognize as Unsinn). [pp. 436-7, n. 48]<br /><br />It would be interesting to hear what Conant has to say about the species in 3.263, as well as the generic characteristics of elucidation. Concerning the latter, elucidations seem to be a use of signs (as propositions, or as nonsense) that allow us to catch on to something else (definitions, "philosophic matters" respectively). That's a first guess.Bradford Bluehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12052774923767969506noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-74813563781784228292012-05-29T07:55:51.406-04:002012-05-29T07:55:51.406-04:00Thanks, Matt. That sounds right as a way to connec...Thanks, Matt. That sounds right as a way to connect thoughts about ostensive definitions with rule-following. And if TLP 3.263 is best read as being about ostensive definitions then the whole thing may well be right. I'm just not sure about 3.263. <br /><br />Is it possible that Brad and I are both right about it? That, as it were, what Wittgenstein means is quite right (and is the kind of thing that you and Brad are suggesting), but that what he actually says is nonsense? I think really to settle the matter you would have to go through the whole book and see whether Brad's interpretation holds up or not. It might.Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-76997827124308529902012-05-29T00:39:31.272-04:002012-05-29T00:39:31.272-04:00I can't comment directly on this, but I wonder...I can't comment directly on this, but I wonder whether the apparent circularity problem in making sense of what an elucidation is (or how it works)--and the reported remark that logical analysis and ostensive definition were unclear to him when he wrote TLP--is related to the puzzles that LW tries to work out in the rule-following remarks of PI...<br /><br />The idea would be that elucidations "acquaint" one with the meanings of signs (the proposed meaning, or how we are to get on with this sign in doing/saying something), but that the elucidation is only later (?) understood, insofar as one gets the hang of using the sign in the proposed way? (That the proof that one has understood the elucidation is that one then proceeds to use the sign/term/etc. in the right/proposed way?) I'm just thinking out loud, and loosely, as it were, so I don't know if this is helpful...Matthew Pianaltohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16380038537888895216noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-8679809754074619502012-05-27T09:37:36.311-04:002012-05-27T09:37:36.311-04:00Thanks, Brad. This makes a lot of sense, but aren&...Thanks, Brad. This makes a lot of sense, but aren't there other reasons for thinking that propositions like "This patch is lilac" can't be what TLP 3.263 is talking about? Otherwise 'lilac' would be the name of an object, wouldn't it? And then it would be strange that Wittgenstein couldn't name any objects. But perhaps I'm misremembering that.<br /><br />As for whether your suggested interpretation is better than "What the...?!", it would seem to be, yes. But if it doesn't work then it isn't better. (I'm not saying that it doesn't work, but I'm not convinced that it does.) And then there's 6.54, of course. If the author of 3.263 tells us that it is nonsense, then an interpretation that makes sense of it is not necessarily preferable to one that does not. Which is not to say we shouldn't <i>try</i> to make sense of it. But when the stretching gets too painful maybe we should quit.Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-39434137017086393462012-05-25T15:01:01.653-04:002012-05-25T15:01:01.653-04:00There is an interesting (and possibly relevant) di...There is an interesting (and possibly relevant) discussion of "elucidation" in <i>The Big Typescript</i> (p. 30)<br /><br />So if to explain the word "lilac" I point to a patch and say "This patch is lilac", can this explanation then work in two ways – on the one hand as a definition that uses the patch as a sign, and on the other as an elucidation [Erläuterung]? And how is the latter possible? I would have to assume that the other person is telling the truth and seeing the same thing I'm seeing. A case that really occurs is something like this: In my presence A tells B that a certain object is lilac. I hear this, and have also seen the object, and think to myself: "Now I know for sure what 'lilac' means". That is, I have extracted an explanation of the word from that description. I could say: If what A told B is the truth, then the word "lilac" must have <i>this</i> meaning.<br /><br />On Wittgenstein's view of an "elucidation" (in 1932), it is a proposition from which one can extract an (ostensive) definition. No mention is made of the <i>Tractatus</i>, but this could be made to fit 3.263. The meaning of a simple sign is an object. If someone is to extract a ostensive explanation of a name out of a proposition containing that name, then he must be acquainted with the object, i.e., he must <i>see</i> what is being pointed to.<br /><br />Perhaps that reading of 3.263 is a stretch, but it seems preferable to "What the . . .?!"Bradford Bluehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12052774923767969506noreply@blogger.com