tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post9061044863022478957..comments2024-02-20T12:26:24.682-05:00Comments on language goes on holiday: The Myth of MoralityDuncan Richterhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-76006664161033638422011-06-29T08:30:04.301-04:002011-06-29T08:30:04.301-04:00I think Joyce is more concerned with categorical i...I think Joyce is more concerned with categorical imperatives in the sense of things that absolutely must (or must not) be done, regardless of one's interests, rather than in terms of universality (although perhaps 'regardless of individual interests' amounts to the same thing). He does seem to think of morality as something like chess, except that no one thinks we have to play chess whereas, he thinks, we ordinarily do think that the game of morality is somehow obligatory. But it isn't, because no sense can be made of the idea that it is. So ordinary moral thinking involves a mistake. <br /><br />His prime examples involve the Nazis, and he likes them to be unambiguous morally, hence extreme. So imagine a concentration camp guard shoving children into a gas chamber, or whatever else you find most appalling. This is supposedly an act that ought not to be done. But if you were to tell the guard that he ought not to do his job then he might disagree. He's been ordered to do it, so he ought to do it. Plus (maybe) the pay's good. And how else are we going to purify the Reich? Etc. In the end, I think Joyce imagines, you would end up spluttering "But it's just <i>wrong!</i>," which doesn't really mean anything. That is, it gives the guard no intelligible reason not to act as he is doing. Hence the idea that some things are morally wrong is wrong. It's roughly Anscombe's critique of the moral 'ought' plus the idea that the incoherent moral 'ought' is central to our notion of morality. <br /><br />More later, I hope. And I hope I'll be able to explain it all more fully and clearly.Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-90885611430964007472011-06-29T02:46:21.738-04:002011-06-29T02:46:21.738-04:00I was at first tempted to say "it's analy...I was at first tempted to say "it's analytic," but realized that wouldn't be helpful.<br /><br /><i>"If x is wrong then it mustn't be done" seems more like an explanation of what "x is wrong" is supposed to mean, to me, than a reason-giving explanation of why wrong things must not be done.</i><br /><br />Right. I think we agree. But then it seems to make no sense that "Because it's wrong," could be a reason in response to the (amoralist's?) question, "Why mustn't I do what is wrong?" That kind of question communicates something like: I'm not playing the game. I'm tempted to say that it's like asking, "Why must I follow the rules when we play chess?" "You mustn't do what's wrong," is a rule, or a stipulation, or axiom or something like that. But it's not a substantive rule, is it? (That is, the substantive rules would be those that specify which sorts of things are wrong.) I guess the question is what exactly is the "game" we're playing when we're "playing" at morality (rather than chess, say). And that's tough, since there are various views about the scope of morality (e.g., Diamond & Crary vs. contractualists or something like that).<br /><br />I wonder about the project of showing "that ordinary moral thinking involves categorical imperatives." If this just means that ordinary moral thinking involves thinking that some things are universally wrong, then ok. But the ordinary students in my classes are fairly varied on a lot of things. They aren't, for example, absolutists about lying. (White lies are ok. Lies to save Anne Frank are ok. Etc.) But I suppose there could still be the thought that in a given context there is a categorically binding answer (for anyone in that situation, etc.), so ok. (Some of my students don't even seem to believe that, for good reason or not, who knows. Presumably not because they've read Peter Winch!)<br /><br />So, in the terms above, he wants to show that ordinary moral thought assumes there are substantive categorically binding rules, and then that there are no such things. Thus, roughly, there are no moral absolutes. Maybe (though of course the "philosopher's Nazi" cases cut against this). Have to think more about it later, head hurting again.Matthew Pianaltohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16380038537888895216noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-9817033715659528682011-06-28T17:40:46.881-04:002011-06-28T17:40:46.881-04:00Yes, I should have explained what he's talking...Yes, I should have explained what he's talking about and started at the beginning too, probably. What he <i>says</i> is that he aims to clarify the inadequate response, but what he means, I think, is to clarify <i>why</i> it's inadequate. He wants to show that ordinary moral thinking involves categorical imperatives, that these imply that there is some reason to do or not do the thing in question, and that no such reason can in fact be found. Hence error theory. Or something like that, anyway. <br /><br />I think it makes everyone's head hurt, which is one reason why it's interesting. "If x is wrong then it mustn't be done" seems more like an explanation of what "x is wrong" is supposed to mean, to me, than a reason-giving explanation of why wrong things must not be done. But maybe the distinction between explanations of meaning and giving reasons is not hard and fast. ("It's analytic" does not seem to explain much to me, so much as it tells someone not to ask for a further explanation. But maybe that's just me.)<br /><br />And, yes, this is heading exactly where you think it is.Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-68710711555830297832011-06-28T16:52:07.400-04:002011-06-28T16:52:07.400-04:00Sorry, I'm a bit lost on what Joyce is doing i...Sorry, I'm a bit lost on what Joyce is doing in this chapter (in part because I haven't read it!). When you say "clarify the inadequate response...", do you mean he intends to clarify <i>why</i> it's inadequate or that he means to clarify the point of the response so that it can be seen to actually be adequate?<br /><br />This stuff makes my head hurt a bit. If the question is just "Why mustn't I do what's wrong?" (rather than, "Why mustn't I do x?"), then isn't the answer just something like, "If X is wrong, then it mustn't be done"? (I.e. that's just what it means for something to be wrong...) It's true then that adding, "Because it's wrong," can't be any kind of reason in response to the question, "Why mustn't I do what's wrong?" But it could be a reason (though perhaps one that immediately needs a further explanation, such as that "it hurts") in response to the question, "Why mustn't I do x?"<br /><br />I'm sure I'm missing something here...(if I recall correctly, Joyce defends error-theory? And so perhaps this is headed in the Mackiean direction of suggestion that this mustn't-be-doneness is not a real property of anything???)Matthew Pianaltohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16380038537888895216noreply@blogger.com