tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post5806719127176432717..comments2024-02-20T12:26:24.682-05:00Comments on language goes on holiday: Does New Jersey moral philosophy corrupt youth?Duncan Richterhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-58583872382316273622010-09-30T15:43:35.168-04:002010-09-30T15:43:35.168-04:00I didn't mean Derrida-and-the-New-Wittgenstein...I didn't mean Derrida-and-the-New-Wittgensteinians, but he might think of them like that. Heidegger too, not surprisingly.Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-73825596618614641632010-09-30T13:03:12.179-04:002010-09-30T13:03:12.179-04:00that's funny, 'derrida and the new wittgen...that's funny, 'derrida and the new wittgensteinians', all those guys.j.https://www.blogger.com/profile/09002699528461726304noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-40250745908332239592010-09-29T21:11:00.097-04:002010-09-29T21:11:00.097-04:00He mostly tries to be polite, but it's not har...He mostly tries to be polite, but it's not hard to guess what he thinks of Derrida and the New Wittgensteinians. I didn't notice any attacks on Gadamer, but then that's not what I was looking for.Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-84566565027594532192010-09-29T20:58:36.446-04:002010-09-29T20:58:36.446-04:00well, crap, i guess i have to read that glock book...well, crap, i guess i have to read that glock book, then.<br /><br />i see paging through it that gadamer gets singled out for a few knocks, as he does in dummett's new book. it's sort of useful sometimes that there are philosophical traditions that are alienated from each other. then when someone from one tradition talks about someone from another, you can index how seriously to take them by what they say about their counterparts.j.https://www.blogger.com/profile/09002699528461726304noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-83911513807080622132010-09-24T07:04:28.514-04:002010-09-24T07:04:28.514-04:00Thanks, Matthew. Setiya's paper is still up h...Thanks, Matthew. Setiya's paper is still up <a rel="nofollow">here</a>. I can't wait to read it. What Pleasants says sounds right, so it'll be interesting to see how Setiya argues for (what appears to be) the opposite view.<br /><br />On McMahan, I agree that we don't have to accept things as they are, but the fact that there is no way we could responsibly eliminate carnivorism from the world (as he recognizes) is connected, I think, with the lack of humility involved in suggesting that this would be a good thing to do in theory. What he's hypothetically proposing is scarcely conceivable, so how can we be at all sure it would be a good thing? Maybe that's the wrong way to put it, or even to approach it. Mostly I think he is missing a full appreciation of just how awesome lions and tigers, etc., are. It's as if he wants a bowdlerized world. Talk of hubris is putting it mildly, it seems to me.Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-43426804650901288952010-09-24T01:10:29.403-04:002010-09-24T01:10:29.403-04:00Variations of your final question have been coming...Variations of your final question have been coming at me from all sorts of directions lately. Nigel Pleasants is contributing a paper to the Philosophical Topics issue--yes, it's still moving along, by the way!--that takes this up wrt both slave abolitionist and animal liberation movements. And he agrees that it's not obviously the arguments doing the work. I just got a book to review for The Philosopher's Magazine by Appiah on moral revolutions; he says in the preface that he discovered the same thing in his studies of several such shifts in moral thinking (say, the sort that occur over a generation or two, as with slavery): the arguments had been around. And then lastly there's Coetzee's various challenges to rational argument as the way of bringing about a change of heart: see in particular his contributions to the discussion in Paola Cavalieri's <i>The Death of the Animal</i>. (These are in his voice rather than through fiction, which makes them particularly interesting in light of his fiction, and suggestive of how one might read, e.g., Costello.)<br /><br />So this really does seem to be the question of the moment. (Also, Kieran Setiya's paper in the PT issue is entitled "Does Moral Theory Corrupt Youth?", so there's another one. That paper might still be on his website, if you want to read it pre-print.)<br /><br />Pleasants suggests that one of the important factors, before an argument can be taken seriously, is that the alternative to the status quo has to be perceived as a genuine (live) option. I think I can see how this would go, say, with arguments that one stop eating meat (or at least factory-farmed meat). For one, some people just refuse to believe that one can have as good a diet (and without enormous expense) if one gives up meat. This is false (for anyone with access to a decent supermarket), but it's a pervasive falsehood. So, Singer's arguments there would fall flat on the ears of anyone who can't buy his case that there's a realistic alternative to eating meat. I think now, bit by bit, that perception is changing. But then there are people who "hate" vegetables, etc.<br /><br />In the case of McMahan's essay, I imagine that many will look at it and think, "so what?" because there's no real, feasible alternative proposed. (Unless, of course, one stops at his arguments against the special value of species, and then one will just say, "That's incorrect.") One might argue on his behalf that the point of the obviously hypothetical argument is to make a case for what our proper attitude (or desire) should be with respect to carnivores and predation. And I suppose one might say that the point is that since we can influence the world (in principle) in any number of ways, we needn't accept of anything in nature that "that's just how things are." But I wonder about that. This may be connected to what j. is talking about as hyper-rationalism.Matthew Pianaltohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16380038537888895216noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-40678944738560145432010-09-23T09:22:25.059-04:002010-09-23T09:22:25.059-04:00Thanks, j. Glock suggests that some religious phi...Thanks, j. Glock suggests that some religious philosophers, some pragmatists (e.g. Rorty), and some politically-minded continental philosophers are guilty of this. They might not be, but it does sound like a thing to avoid.<br /><br />His take on Wittgensteinians of my ilk is not one that makes me very sympathetic to his work usually, but this book seems pretty good to me so far. He thinks that analytic philosophy is a family resemblance concept, so if you want to know what he thinks you don't need to read the whole book. I want to know more about the history of analytic philosophy and about what other people think philosophy is or should be. It's pretty useful for that. <br /><br />As for my last question, I mostly just wanted to echo Elizabeth Anscombe's question about Oxford moral philosophy, partly as a joke. But Glock points out that the controversy Singer created in Germany has begun a dialogue about euthanasia that would have been impossible before. So these people really might be influencing the culture (perhaps in good ways, at least some of the time). On the whole, though, like you and Anscombe, I think it's the culture that paves the way for the philosophers, not vice versa.Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-76165809894522653352010-09-23T00:21:04.663-04:002010-09-23T00:21:04.663-04:00whose philosophy's methods and results are pre...whose philosophy's methods and results are predetermined by prior practical commitments?<br /><br />i tried reading this book once, and really couldn't stand it, but since i could use a clear statement of what ol h.-j. g. thinks philosophy is supposed to be, maybe i should just grit my teeth and get through it.<br /><br /><br />i can see why you'd ask your last question, but i do think that there is just a mode of bug-eyed hyper-rationality circulating in the culture that pre-dates any of these particular philosophers' work: justifiedly unwilling to accept any checks upon reasoned discussion, and temperamentally inclined to disbelieve anything for which a rational account hasn't been given and accepted.j.https://www.blogger.com/profile/09002699528461726304noreply@blogger.com