tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post4248762418753796385..comments2024-02-20T12:26:24.682-05:00Comments on language goes on holiday: Human rightsDuncan Richterhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-60163651279510454432011-07-26T13:26:18.064-04:002011-07-26T13:26:18.064-04:00Yes, that's probably true. I don't know ho...Yes, that's probably true. I don't know how far we would get avoiding not just 'good' and 'bad' but also all the other words we might use in their place (I mean 'thin' words like 'nice' and 'evil', not 'brave,' 'dishonest', etc.), but it might be (probably is) possible. I take Gaita to be saying not only that talk about rights is not necessary but that we ought to get rid of it or abandon it. I don't see why that is so desirable, partly (if not wholly) because I don't see that the word 'rights' really has all the metaphysical baggage that Gaita seems to think it does. In some uses it might, but not, I think, in all. When I think of organizations like Human Rights Watch and Unicef replacing all references to rights with some other language I can't help thinking that it would be more trouble than it was worth. If philosophers think the concept has some deep or explanatory value, though, then I might refer them to Gaita and Weil.<br /><br />Back to the question of whether we could do without the word 'rights'. I don't know, but I think this is an interesting question. If the word is used in a secondary sense then we could not do without it, I take it. And a case could be made that the word is (at least sometimes) used in such a way. But I'm in the process of re-thinking this case. (By 'thinking' here I mean occasionally blogging about it and, in the meantime, hoping that something good occurs to me about it.)Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-6675571449265380252011-07-26T10:08:36.064-04:002011-07-26T10:08:36.064-04:00The long answer: read some books (a list would be ...<i>The long answer: read some books (a list would be necessary for this to be a really long answer, but since it would probably start with Shakespeare and perhaps the Bible I won't spell it out here).</i><br /><br />Couldn't we say that, for roughly the same reason we don't need a theory to underpin rights talk, we don't need the rights talk either?<br /><br />I was here thinking of Cora Diamond's well-known <i>Grundgedanke</i> - for which the classic statement is probably her paper "Wittgenstein, Mathematics and Ethics: Resisting the Attractions of Realism" - that any specific term in a language need not occur in any occasion of using that language for this occasion to be an ethical one. We could, for instance, raise children to be good human beings without ever speaking to them with adjectives such as "good" and "bad", through means such as encouraging them to admire certain fictional characters and being dismayed by others. ("The long answer: read some books.")<br /><br />If "good talk" and "bad talk" are thus unnecessary, doesn't the same go for rights talk as well in that case?Tommi Uschanovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02852865209279310471noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-33093481842122245752011-07-26T09:24:13.901-04:002011-07-26T09:24:13.901-04:00Thanks, Matt. You're right that the line betwe...Thanks, Matt. You're right that the line between a theory and what I'm calling an account is unclear. And I agree with you and Biletzki that how we think of, and talk about, rights will influence how we get along with others when we talk about, or try to protect or promote, rights with them. But I don't see this being a huge problem (in practice) for people working to protect children's rights, say, or human rights in general. And I certainly don't see that we need the kind of theory that would justify or provide a foundation for rights-talk. In fact, I think we will never have any such foundation for any ethics. God is a kind of foundation for theistic ethics (including theistic beliefs in rights) but not exactly an <i>explanatory</i> foundation. God is too mysterious for references to Him to explain much. (I don't consider this to be a strike against theism in any way, except as an explanatory theory. But then I don't think that belief in God is meant to be an explanatory theory.)Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-33691190737070196752011-07-25T21:50:00.600-04:002011-07-25T21:50:00.600-04:00That's really helpful, thanks! The line betwee...That's really helpful, thanks! The line between a theory and something more bare bones is definitely unclear. I'm not sure whether one can settle how theoretical or metaphysical morality is in that sense without simply trying out various theories and testing them on their merits. In any case, these are fun questions, thanks for the discussion.Matthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01562649776374771198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-61832437534226477352011-07-25T17:24:36.916-04:002011-07-25T17:24:36.916-04:00Thanks, Matt.
I agree with your first paragraph a...Thanks, Matt.<br /><br />I agree with your first paragraph above entirely. That is, I don't think she really offers an explanation or justification for rights talk, although she does mention various ways it might be justified (or avenues to explore for the would-be justifier).<br /><br />I'm less sure about the idea that once we say we can appeal to human interests, etc. then it sounds like we're committing to having a theory. That might depend on what counts as a theory though. Some kind of account seems to be implied, yes, so if account = theory then I agree. But I don't think that a debate about human interests would need to be very theoretical. It wouldn't have to be very philosophical, at least. It seems like the kind of thing that philosophers <i>might</i> be able to help with, but it also might turn out that they would have nothing qua philosophers to contribute. If that's obscure, here's what I mean: it seems to me to be the kind of issue that could be discussed and settled just fine by people like Unicef, although it sometimes does help to have good critical thinkers on hand in case things get messy. But we don't, I think, need to get very metaphysical in such matters. I think my view is very similar to Rorty's on this, if that helps.<br /><br />And I share your view that this series is valuable. I'm glad the Times brought it back.Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-47231836233351439552011-07-25T16:23:20.052-04:002011-07-25T16:23:20.052-04:00Reading over it again, I'm getting less and le...Reading over it again, I'm getting less and less clear about what Biletzski's position is. On the one hand, she speaks of "justifying human rights." On the other, she speaks of an "axiomatic" or "dogmatic" "posit of human dignity," as if there's simply a brute connection between humanity and rights about which we can say nothing. But that position, as I tried to show in my post, seems to amount to saying that there just are human rights, and no further explanation is possible. So what is doing the justifying? <br /><br />I think Biletzki is definitely right to say that how we theorize about human rights matters for how we talk about them with others. While she mentions the "internal, secular debate" about human rights as distinct from a debate between (say) a theist and an atheist about human rights, it's unclear how she thinks that debate should go. It's one thing to say that we can appeal to human interests, needs, and so on-- but once we say that, it sounds like we're committing to having a theory, since we would need to know which kinds of interests and needs are relevant, and how they matter, and so on.<br /><br />I should say that I enjoyed her article quite a bit, and am grateful that the NYT has this series. Boghossian's piece yesterday was pretty insightful; probably the first time relativized truth predicates have been mentioned in a major newspaper!Matthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01562649776374771198noreply@blogger.com