tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post4118542915520873017..comments2024-02-20T12:26:24.682-05:00Comments on language goes on holiday: Examples of social scienceDuncan Richterhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comBlogger21125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-54173982739720405872014-06-05T09:48:49.782-04:002014-06-05T09:48:49.782-04:00Sounds nice.Sounds nice.Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-71269327152007035152014-06-04T01:02:31.792-04:002014-06-04T01:02:31.792-04:00Good luck with having yourself translated! I find ...Good luck with having yourself translated! I find being in a pleasant natural setting less distracting than being at home or in the office, where there are other chores to do, things to fiddle with and so on. And if I get stuck I can go walk along the Kentucky River...Matthew Pianaltohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16380038537888895216noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-36966534644525402742014-06-02T14:12:27.547-04:002014-06-02T14:12:27.547-04:00This talk isn't until August, but I had to hav...This talk isn't until August, but I had to have it written by now to submit the text in advance (for translation into Spanish). I think it's much better for having these examples in it. Thanks again for the suggestion.<br /><br />Writing in a state park sounds as though it could be very nice, but also like something that might require a lot of discipline. I hope it's working.Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-66961308032142321532014-05-28T13:34:55.700-04:002014-05-28T13:34:55.700-04:00I'm glad my comments prompted these examples, ...I'm glad my comments prompted these examples, and I apologize for just catching this post now. (I've been imposing a lot of non-internet access upon myself at a nearby state park so that I can concentrate fully on writing...) I think they work, though I haven't read the discussion above in the context of the revision. How did the talk go?Matthew Pianaltohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16380038537888895216noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-81256203477909287952014-05-26T12:27:55.867-04:002014-05-26T12:27:55.867-04:00http://sociologicalimagination.org/archives/3222
-...http://sociologicalimagination.org/archives/3222<br />-dmfAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-13514273003765389752014-05-23T17:22:32.335-04:002014-05-23T17:22:32.335-04:00I'm not sure what to say about this. You might...I'm not sure what to say about this. You might be right. I'm tempted to say that "reality itself" means nothing, but I need to think about this more. It isn't meant to refer, after all, to reality as treated by science, nor as treated by religion, nor as treated by any other particular language game or form of discourse. Every language game that has not been abandoned works, more or less, but that doesn't mean that reality somehow proves it correct. Or so I want to say. But I also want to say that this is the only thing that "being proved correct by reality" could mean. So I'm not sure what to say. I hope I can return to this soon, but I'm going away for a few days so it could be a week or two at least before I can really think about it. Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-88264374968021066942014-05-23T09:35:15.280-04:002014-05-23T09:35:15.280-04:00I was thinking some more about this passage (which...I was thinking some more about this passage (which prompted my initial reaction above):<br /><br />"Reality itself no more justifies science than it justifies ethics or religion. I said earlier that apartheid really is wrong. That is true. But if anyone denies it then I cannot prove myself right by pointing to reality. What reality would I point to? The unhappy victims of apartheid, perhaps, but when I say that apartheid is unjust I do not mean that it makes people unhappy. Some injustices leave no unhappy survivors. Similarly, the best proof we have that science is true is that it works so well. But ‘true’ no more means ‘works well’ than ‘just’ means ‘makes people happy’. Not to mention the fact that science may yet lead to results that we do not consider useful at all."<br /><br />But in a sense reality <em>does</em> justify science if we pursue science for its success in the world, as you acknowledge (i.e., for the things it has shown it can accomplish for us). Isn't <em>that</em> "reality" in the relevant sense here?<br /><br />Also, saying that apartheid is wrong because it makes some people unhappy isn't necessarily to take a utilitarian stance, as in the maxim that the production of unhappiness in mankind ought to be minimized. For, indeed, one might say that apartheid, in some cases, might actually minimize the sum total of unhappiness among the totality of all human beings even if it allows some unhappiness among some.<br /><br />When I alluded to the role of unhappiness in determining apartheid to be wrong, I meant the state of mind in which a human being seeks to or tolerates the production of unhappiness in others, not the amount of happiness (or its absence) that is brought into the world.<br /><br />I think this is the important difference between a consequentialist ethics and one that concerns itself with the mental state of the agent(s), i.e., the agent's intention(s). And I think that <em>is</em> where we have to go if we're to give an adequate account of ethical judgment as a human activity.<br /><br />Anyway, I didn't want to horn in again but I couldn't get that paragraph out of my mind and have come to think that my earlier comments really didn't go to what I take to be the heart of the matter! <br /><br /> Stuart W. Mirskyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12247784373895331173noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-52772277659737783482014-05-22T16:24:59.895-04:002014-05-22T16:24:59.895-04:00Thanks. Yes, the word 'science' is tricky ...Thanks. Yes, the word 'science' is tricky here, especially bearing in mind that the, so to speak, scientistic use of the word in English seems to be both relatively recent and still not universal. Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-10502711572039886742014-05-22T16:20:53.742-04:002014-05-22T16:20:53.742-04:00Possibly. Wes Sharrock doesn't seem to think s...Possibly. Wes Sharrock doesn't seem to think so, and he ought to know better than I do. But I should look at some sociology journals from 1958 to see what they are like. <br /><br />I've been thinking, or trying to think, about in what sense Winch might be a relativist. He isn't an extreme relativist, but I think he might be a methodological relativist, and that seems to be a widely accepted thing to be in the social sciences. So that might be another way in which he has won.Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-88881554471773732922014-05-22T13:02:31.725-04:002014-05-22T13:02:31.725-04:00It is not that God or the reality of God exists on...<i>It is not that God or the reality of God exists only within such language, but the idea of God belongs within such language, within a particular kind of thinking, talking, writing, painting, and so on.</i><br /><br />This gave rise, by proxy, to a whole new train of thought:<br /><br />The problem to which Winch offers the solution is itself different in different languages, because the English word <i>science</i> and the comparable words of other languages often belong to altogether different kinds of semantic field. The concept of science is itself always tied to a particular natural language, and thus to "a particular kind of thinking, talking, writing [...], and so on".<br /><br />Finnish, for instance, used to be a wholly vernacular language until the 19th century. So even the most common abstract nouns are usually neologisms that were coined by a small number of enthusiasts during a short period roughly between 1810 and 1880. This includes <i>tiede</i>, a 1842 coinage, which usually translates the English <i>science</i> today. It's part of a conceptual dyad, the other half of which is <i>taide</i> – which in turn translates the English <i>art</i>. The nouns were derived from the verbs <i>tietää</i>, 'to know (that _____)', and <i>taitaa</i>, 'to know (how to _____)'. So <i>tiede</i>, science, is so to say <i>the pinnacle of theoretical knowledge</i>, in the same sense in which <i>taide</i>, art, is the pinnacle of practical knowledge.<br /><br />There is no positivist or monist suggestion in <i>tiede</i> that there is <i>a</i> science, in the singular, to which the various sciences are approximations – much less that this science-in-the-singular is natural science. When I studied aesthetics as an undergraduate, one of the textbooks was punningly titled <i>Miten teen tiedettä taiteesta</i>, 'How to make science out of art' – but this did not mean 'How to do aesthetics on the model of natural science', but simply 'How to do aesthetics in academia'. If something is done there, that already suffices to make it an instance of <i>tiede</i>. The local labour union for university teachers is <i>Tieteentekijöiden liitto</i>, 'The science-doers' league' – and it includes everyone from Heideggerian philosophers to nuclear physicists.<br /><br />This is directly relevant to Winch, because his book has been translated into Finnish. But revealingly, the very title of the book is different: instead of <i>Yhteiskuntatieteen ajatus</i>, which would be a word-for-word translation of <i>The Idea of a Social Science</i>, it's <i>Yhteiskuntatieteet ja filosofia</i> – '<b>The</b> social science<b>s</b> and philosophy'. And it could not even have been translated word-for-word. Due to the above considerations, <i>yhteiskuntatieteen ajatus</i> would mean 'the idea of a social science' in the other sense, from which you differentiate Winch's concerns both in your paper and in your blog post above. The philosophically innocuous sense, in which nobody, not even Rupert Read, objects to "the idea of a social science", as you correctly point out yourself. "The idea of one or another of the social sciences" is the closest English approximation I can think of.<br /><br />This does not mean that the translation of Winch's book was unnecessary. Many, all too many, have tried to do social science on the model of natural science in Finnish too – and precisely because <i>tiede</i> is such a broad church, it also includes these unfortunate attempts as <i>instances</i> of itself. But the "idea of a social science" itself, in the sense in which Winch's title refers to it, does not exist in the language. Indeed, the very fact that the problem for which the title is a shorthand <i>can</i> arise even in a language in which the title cannot be translated intelligibly, leads me to question whether "the idea of a social science" is the best available shorthand for it <i>in English</i>.<br />Tommi Uschanovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02852865209279310471noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-22879077309434813092014-05-22T12:45:05.112-04:002014-05-22T12:45:05.112-04:00It seems to me that this paper by Brand and Thomas...<i>It seems to me that this paper by Brand and Thomas supports this view.</i><br /><br />Very true. But it also supports my view (expressed in an earlier discussion) that Winch's book, however much it was to the point when written and published, has since become simply dated. If you'd look at sociology journals from 1958, you wouldn't find any papers whose final paragraph reads anything like this, but today you do find them.<br /><br />Wittgensteinians are accustomed to regarding themselves as an unpopular minority, no matter what the context is, and certainly with justification in <i>most</i> contexts. But doesn't the fact that the very first recent paper, in a sociology journal picked at random, is already something like this, mean that Winch has largely won this particular battle?<br />Tommi Uschanovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02852865209279310471noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-38900517677193929432014-05-22T09:56:06.333-04:002014-05-22T09:56:06.333-04:00I would want to say that this all depends on the k...<i>I would want to say that this all depends on the kind of appeal and the kind of proof we have in mind. </i><br /><br />I agree.<br /><br /><i>Must we hold that apartheid is wrong because it's just wrong in order to reject it in particular cases?</i><br /><br />No. And in fact saying that it is "just wrong" really isn't saying much at all, I think.<br /><br />Thanks for your comments. I think we're very much on the same page.Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-4711302184406913382014-05-22T09:37:57.805-04:002014-05-22T09:37:57.805-04:00Winch probably would not. But, and this is to rang...Winch probably would not. But, and this is to range far afield from Winch who is your concern here (so perhaps this tangent needs to be cut short by me quite soon!), I would want to say that this all depends on the <em>kind</em> of appeal and the <em>kind</em> of proof we have in mind. For instance, granting that apartheid cannot be shown to be wrong based on some factual claim about how the world is, there are certainly plenty of facts we might invoke to show why it's wrong in certain cases (or even, perhaps, right in others). There are facts about the nature of the entities involved which are relevant, for instance, such as whether or not the entities affected are like us in relevant ways? If they are, then we could make an argument for rejecting apartheid in that case. And isn't that the issue?<br /><br />Of course, the issue then is why we should think being like us in relevant ways provides an argument against treating them differently than ourselves. Must we hold that apartheid is wrong because it's <em>just</em> wrong in order to reject it in particular cases?<br /><br />Apartheid, itself, seems to be fact-neutral but, because it represents a policy of behaviors undertaken by some rational agents in some cases, it's not immune to the facts which surround its implementation. How we feel toward the others is also a matter of fact, at least of a certain type, but to the extent that we have control over our feelings (which I think we do to some degree) there is room for argument. <br /><br />If the point in moral judgment is to assess behaviors (and the policies they implement) by placing them on a scale of relative desirability (preferability?), then the question must be whether we can have any kind of basis to do that. And here is where sentiment seems to kick in. Our sentiments inform our intentions, which underlie the actions expressing those intentions. So an argument for or against a particular policy, say apartheid, must hinge on how that policy <em>looks</em> to us, how we feel about it, and here we see plenty of room for propaganda and cultural brainwashing. But if that's all there is to this, then moral relativism seems to be true and that means a break down in the moral game.<br /><br />The question concerning the validity of making moral judgments must depend on whether or not we can argue for or against such judgments based on our capacity to have the right sentiments (i.e., the right intentions). What would make moral discourse rational at bottom would be whether we can choose to have or not have the sentiments in question. If moral judgment is ultimately subjective at every level, if we have the sentiments we have just because we are what we are or others have inculcated these into us, then propaganda and cultural brainwashing is all that this can be about.<br /><br />But if we can discern a level where the subjective element is diminished, or perhaps plays a different role in the discourse, then there is room for reasoned argument about moral questions at the level of our fundamental moral beliefs. And it is this possibility of reasoned argument, I think, that makes moral valuing work as valuing activity.<br /><br />Anyway, I've taken this too far away from your interest in getting feedback on your assessment of Winch (on whom I am not qualified, I fear, to offer any useful feedback). So I'll lay off this line of discussion for now. Thanks, though, for considering my points. Stuart W. Mirskyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12247784373895331173noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-68305273295201206742014-05-22T08:26:42.503-04:002014-05-22T08:26:42.503-04:00in the physical sciences (of the lab sort) one can...<i>in the physical sciences (of the lab sort) one can in effect reverse-engineer some happening in the world (chemical-reaction, etc) break it down and isolate the necessary elements and than test if we can reproduce the effect, this isn't possible in the "social" aspects of life and so they are very different tasks. </i><br /><br />Agreed.<br /><br /><i>Of course, it's certainly not like the physical sciences. There are different standards of observation, different methods in play in the social sciences. But I wouldn't think that makes social science more like philosophy than like the physical sciences</i><br /><br />In itself it doesn't, that's right. How like philosophy social science is depends on what the social scientist is trying to do. If it's to understand other people and their behavior then we need to understand, make sense of, their concepts. And that is rather like what philosophers do. If it's to argue some moral or political point then that too is like what philosophers do, although this is not really Winch's point.Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-43460297913398320872014-05-22T08:24:36.566-04:002014-05-22T08:24:36.566-04:00"The key, though, is to determine how intenti..."The key, though, is to determine how intentions can be picked out as objects of reference" it would be the key if it were objectively possible, as philosophers of science like Isabelle Stengers have pointed out even bench-science is a working out (engineering) of situated human interests but as I said above these can be mechanized/routinized in ways that human behaviors/interactions cannot. So what we get is moralizing/manipulating or as Stanley Fish says doing what comes naturally...<br />-dmfAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-24898698889449055762014-05-22T08:22:17.023-04:002014-05-22T08:22:17.023-04:00I have a lot of sympathy with this view. The point...I have a lot of sympathy with this view. The point I want to make is that we can believe that apartheid, for instance, really is unjust, without thinking that this can really be proved by appeal to reality. As you point out, we can persuade people by pointing out various facts and engaging their sympathies, but this does not work on everyone and is not a case, I would say, of reality's showing that some things are just and others unjust. Reality does not dictate that we even have a concept of justice. Or so I think Winch might say. I'm not sure what this notion of objective or independent reality amounts to in the end. But if it is a fantasy or nonsensical idea then it is certainly true that this nonsense proves nothing. Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-15749758961771034012014-05-21T20:16:02.560-04:002014-05-21T20:16:02.560-04:00We don't have to know intentions before the fa...We don't have to know intentions before the fact in order to judge them when they are expressed. We only have to know them when we "see" them. Judging them, I would say, is exactly what moral valuing seems to be about, i.e., whether the agent intended something beneficial or harmful to another by his or her action? And we judge them in ourselves in a generally similar way (because moral valuing applies to others as agents as well as to agents as evaluators).<br /><br />The key, though, is to determine how intentions can be picked out as objects of reference since they are obviously not like the physical objects we ordinarily speak about and which constitute the most familiar referencing paradigm. This is going to be somewhat controversial, if only because of the divergence of the paradigm. However, if we can't pick out particular intentions, then how can we speak of moral valuing at all since that sort of value presumes an aware agent with the capacity to change his or her mind, do one thing rather than another. And what the agent wants to do is(are) his or her intention(s). Now if we can't pick these sorts of features out in others and ourselves, just what is it that we think we're referring to, and how do we distinguish between better and worse intentions, when we speak of right or wrong actions? <br /><br />To the extent social science is about judging <em>how</em> and <em>why</em> humans tend to behave in particular circumstances and along different behavioral vectors (economic, personal, reactions to certain kinds of stimuli, etc.) we seem to be interested in behavioral tendencies primarily as quantified statistically. But I would suggest that moral valuing isn't and can't be a matter of social science like that, although the facts of how any group of humans make their choices, express their values (and the values they express) would be.<br /><br />Of course, it's certainly not like the physical sciences. There are different standards of observation, different methods in play in the social sciences. But I wouldn't think that makes social science more like philosophy than like the physical sciences (though sometimes philosophy is surely done like some of the social sciences, e.g., cultural anthropology). I think Duncan is right that the scientific aspect, what makes a science science, has to do with methodology more than subject matter (although subject matter will largely determine methodology). That is, science as a discipline seems to me to depend on the extent to which we are systematically prepared to attend to observable elements in the scenarios being studied. And this is as true for the social sciences as the physical kind.Stuart W. Mirskyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12247784373895331173noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-70945159035474407352014-05-21T18:32:55.887-04:002014-05-21T18:32:55.887-04:00in the physical sciences (of the lab sort) one can...in the physical sciences (of the lab sort) one can in effect reverse-engineer some happening in the world (chemical-reaction, etc) break it down and isolate the necessary elements and than test if we can reproduce the effect, this isn't possible in the "social" aspects of life and so they are very different tasks. <br />by the way how would we know/verify before the fact/act 'intentions" let alone judge them? <br />-dmfAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-59226195484430706432014-05-21T17:55:36.386-04:002014-05-21T17:55:36.386-04:00I see where you're coming from but I think it&...I see where you're coming from but I think it's better to look for the moral good <em>in our intentions</em>, our attitudes, in the stuff happening in our minds when we act, rather than in the things that are brought about (consequentialism). And there I'd say the issue is how do we react to someone else's suffering (from discomfort to unease to outright pain).<br /><br />If we say that apartheid is just wrong because, well it's unjust (meaning it's wrong), we really haven't solved the problem because scenarios can be conceived in which it might actually be just. Suppose there was a race of primitive hominids discovered on a remote island, related to us but not enough to be classed as members of homo sapiens. And suppose they had minds roughly equivalent to that of very young human children. Would we not think treating them like wards of humanity, roughly the way parents treat their children, was morally right?<br /><br />What makes us think of something as unjust, I would say, is the <em>recognition</em> that others suffer from experiencing it. Moral arguments in the real world tend to be about things like how others are feeling as in "how would you feel if that were done to you?"<br /><br />In the 1950's and 60's in this country Jim Crow segregation in the south (and its lesser but still discriminatory forms in the north) was dismantled across American society. What made that happen was widely disseminated information (via television news reporting) about what other human beings were facing, what they had to endure under such a system. <br /><br />People began to see themselves in those others and suddenly it wasn't just an abstract issue anymore. It was harder and harder for many of them to justify a claim that the people suffering under segregation were materially different from those who weren't (although some did make that argument and, in principle at least I think one could make it -- see my example above). The people enduring segregation and discrimination were born, grew up, worked, raised kids, cared about their lives, struggled to make a go of things, just like the people who did not have to endure segregation and discrimination. They were just as human, just as susceptible to suffering as those who did not have to face segregation. They cried, felt anguish from the humiliation inflicted on them (riding in the back of the bus, being banished to second class facilities, restricted from full participation in civil society, etc.) and pain and hardship arising from the deprivation of rights the non-segregated people possessed.<br /><br />I don't believe an abstract argument about what was just or what was good, just because it's a human thing to want or need, could have worked in those days. What did work though was the opening up of the minds of the non-discriminated against folks, the change of perspective that occurred among the part of the population that did not have to endure segregation. <br /><br />Once the essential similarity between both groups was brought home to the non-suffering group, shame and embarrassment and, most importantly, sympathy for the sufferers arose among the non-discriminated population and then things changed.<br /><br />Martin Luther King Jr. knew it instinctively. But in philosophy we sometimes have to figure it out because we tend to expect logic to carry the day. But logic only works when you have a set of givens to work with. In the moral case that's the sentiments which inform and shape our lives and, I would say, especially empathy which powers other feelings and realizations (like sympathy and concern for justice) that we have. Stuart W. Mirskyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12247784373895331173noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-46038847217748956522014-05-21T16:01:11.597-04:002014-05-21T16:01:11.597-04:00You're certainly right that happiness is relev...You're certainly right that happiness is relevant. But unless you're a utilitarian then you don't think that happiness is the only thing that matters. Similarly, if you're a pragmatist then you won't accept my distinction between truth and what works. Neither utilitarianism nor pragmatism is simply true by definition, though. I guess I'm relying on that fact to make my point. Perhaps that's a mistake.Duncan Richterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15708344766825805406noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6454161596094447448.post-26217991585331678362014-05-21T15:17:56.685-04:002014-05-21T15:17:56.685-04:00You write that apartheid isn't wrong because i...You write that apartheid isn't wrong because it makes some people unhappy because there are cases where some behaviors that we think wrong leave no one alive to be unhappy. But that doesn't seem right to me. The reason we believe apartheid and Jim Crow laws and slavery are wrong is precisely because these things impose suffering, unhappiness, on others. If they didn't would we still think them wrong? Isn't THAT just the injustice we ascribe to such institutions? We treat children as second class to adults in terms of their personal freedoms at least and even if we think some children are unhappy about that at least some of the time, we still think that their happiness in general is enhanced by denying them the rights we grant adults. Similarly we might say as much for the mentally impaired. I would think the same goes for the animals we keep, especially as pets. What creates the difference in cases like apartheid is that in these instances rules are imposed on, or rights denied to, others which impair their happiness as creatures like ourselves. Couldn't we conceive of cases where a kind of social distinction between different races WOULD be justified based on real differnces in capacity, even if there are no sufficient differences between different human groups? I don't think we can separate the circumstance of causing unhappiness in others from our belief in the wrongness of the acts which cause it.<br />Stuart W. Mirskyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12247784373895331173noreply@blogger.com